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FEDERAL PROTECTION OF WETLANDS THROUGH 
LEGAL PROCESS 
Christopher B. Myhrum * 
Wet lands and saturated soils are not only unremunerative, but if the 
area is considerable, they prove a source of enervation and disease to the 
section in which they exist. Although individuals may neglect swamp 
lands, or find their reclamation and drainage too expensive, the State 
cannot afford to be indifferent to their continuance, because they check 
production, limit population, and reduce the standard of vigor and 
health. Their value, too, when reclaimed, in an economic view will be 
greatly enhanced. 
President of the American Public Health Association, 1876. 1 
Wetlands are areas of great natural productivity, hydrological utility, 
and environmental diversity, providing natural flood control, improved 
water quality, recharge of aquifers, flow stabilization of streams and 
rivers, and habitat for fish and wildlife resources. Wetlands contribute 
to the productivity of agricultural products and timber, and provide 
recreational, scientific, and aesthetic resources of national interest. This 
piecemeal alteration and destruction of wetlands through draining, 
dredging, filling and other means has had an adverse cumulative impact 
on our natural resources and on the quality of human life. 
President Carter, 1977.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The diametrically opposed viewpoints presented above reflect the 
profound change in attitudes towards wetland areas and the growing 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Toner, A View of Some of the Leading Public Health Questions in the United States, II 
PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 1, 22 (1876). 
2 Presidential Statement accompanying Executive Order No. 11990, 13 WEEKLY COMPo OF 
PRES. Doc. 808, 809 (May 24, 1977). 
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appreciation of the importance of wetlands to the ecological balance 
of the envirc:,>nment. The protection of wetland areas is a vitally 
important priority in the effort to restore and maintain water qual-
ity and preserve natural hydrologic cycles.3 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CW A)4 represents the 
most recent attempt by the federal government to regulate dis-
charges of dredged and fill material into any waters of the United 
States. Initially established by the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), 5 the Section 404 program has 
evolved to encompass wetland areas in its protective scheme. The 
development of Section 404 did not follow the usual paradigm of the 
legislative process, which might be summarized as follows: initial 
recognition of a problem, albeit in general terms; inquiry and study 
by legislative committees; drafting, amendment and enactment of 
legislation designed to address the problem; and, after implementa-
tion and experience in application, possibly revision. The enact-
ment, in 1977, of revisions to Section 404 of FWPCA was the culmi-
nation of a much different sort of development. In fact, a program 
had evolved where apparently none was intended by Congress; the 
1977 Amendments to Section 404 codified and expanded a regula-
tory program that had emerged from coincidence and fortuitous 
happenstance. 
A generalized overview of the sequence of events discussed in this 
article demonstrates the disparity between the legislative paradigm 
and the anomalous genesis and growth of Section 404. In 1972, Con-
gress enacted Section 404 of FWPCA with the apparent intent only 
of exempting dredging activities undertaken for navigational main-
tenance from the regulatory authority of the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8 The section, however, 
3 Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings 
Before Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976) (Statement of Russell 
Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter cited as Sen. 404 
Hearings]. 
4 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1600 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 
1344 (1976)). 
5 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 884, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). The FWPCA, while technically an amendment to 
the pre-existing statutory scheme, was in fact a total revision of the prior statutory material. 
The 1972 Act was amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 
1566 (1977) and Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2467 (1978). The 1972 Amendments are referred 
to as FWPCA; the 1977 revisions are referred to as CW A. 
• The Section reads: 
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was not conscientiously drafted. As a result, two troublesome terms 
were employed: "navigable waters" and "fill material." The mean-
ing of these terms, especially the former, became the subject of an 
acrimonious debate between the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps),7 the agency 
mandated to administer Section 404. The agencies disputed the 
parameters of territorial jurisdiction and the nature of the activities 
which Congress had intended the Corps to regulate, with EPA 
claiming that a broad interpretation of the scope of the Act was 
mandated.8 
Judicial interpretation of the term "navigable waters" as used in 
FWPCA supported EPA's position,9 but the Corps refused to yield. 
Environmental groups brought suit, and a federal district court or-
dered the Corps to expand its program. to The administrative re-
§ 1344. Permits for dredged or fill material 
(a) Issuance by Secretary of Army 
The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, may issue permits, 
after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill mate-
rial into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. 
(b) Specification for disposal sites 
Subject to subsection (c) of this section each such disposal site shall be specified for 
each such permit by the Secretary of the Army (1) through the application of guidelines 
developed by the Administrator [of EPA], in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, 
which guidelines shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the 
territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section 1343(c) of this title, and 
(2) in any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone would prohibit the specifica-
tion of a site, through the application additionally of the economic impact of the site on 
navigation and anchorage. 
(c) Denial of specifications by Administrator; hearing; findings 
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal 
of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or 
restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specifica-
tion) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public 
hearings that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable 
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including 
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such determi-
nation, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary of the Army. The Administra-
tor shall set forth in writing and make public his findings and his reasons for making any 
determination under this subsection. 
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976) (subsequently amended by § 67 of CWA) (emphasis added). 
7 See text at notes 137-47, infra. 
• See text at notes 141-43, infra. 
• Cases supporting EPA's broad interpretation of the term "navigable waters" as used in 
FWPCA are United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. 
Ky. 1973), afl'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 
665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). 
I. N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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sponse to the court order established the first comprehensive regula-
tory program that covered dredging and filling activities in most 
major wetland areas. 11 
Misinformation generated by a press release of the Corps, which 
implied that the Corps intended to forbid a vast array of previously 
unregulated activities, led to lobbying efforts to delimit the Section 
404 program. Initial legislative proposals which would have eviscer-
ated the scope of the program eventually succumbed to more moder-
ate revisions which contoured the substance of the 1977 Amend-
ments to the original Section 404.12 
While a chronological approach can describe the events which 
impelled the present federal effort to protect wetlands, it cannot 
adequately present the reasons for the unusual process which took 
place. This legal process attending the development of the Section 
404 program involved all three branches of government, dynamic 
forces of history and legal doctrine, and the impetus of the environ-
mental movement. Therefore, in order to provide a perspective sur-
vey of this peculiar process, this article employs a different ap-
proach, first discussing wetlands, their importance in the eco-
system and the pressures upon them. A brief review of seminal state 
regulatory efforts reveals the shortcomings of the pollution control 
strategies of the states, and the necessity of a federal presence in 
water pollution control. An historical perspective follows, introduc-
ing the troublesome term "navigable waters" and the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899,13 and by means of the illustrative examples of 
the application of Sections 10 and 13 of that Act the foundation is 
laid for analysis of subsequent events. An account of the enactment 
of Section 404 of FWPCA follows, detailing the drafting mistakes 
which portend the dispute between EPA and the Corps. The discus-
sion next reviews the litigation which prompted administrative ex-
pansion of the Section 404 program, and then focuses upon the 
elements of the program which are especially significant to the pro-
tection of wetlands. The remainder of the article presents the legis-
lative response to the surprising evolution of Section 404, surveying 
the maneuvering and debate in Congress and culminating with an 
II The regulation promulgated pursuant to court order is discussed in detail in text at notes 
160·98, infra. 
12 See text at notes 242·98, infra. 
13 Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 (original 
§ 9), 403 (original § 10), 407 (original § 13)), 
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examination of the expansive legislative revisions of Section 404 in 
CWA.14 
n. THE EYE OF THE STORM - WETLANDS 
A. A Definitional Problem 
Wetlands, as the name implies, can generally be defined as the 
zone of land lying between permanently inundated areas and dry, 
"fast" land. This inexact definition, however, is inadequate, for 
throughout the nation are isolated, "perched" wetlands which, 
while not adjacent to any body of water, are nonetheless connected 
to the water table. 15 Common parlance recites swamps, marshes, 
bogs, wet meadows and mudflats as different types of wetlands. II 
The factor shared by all is saturated soil conditions. 
No exact legal definition of wetlands exists17 not only because of 
" Section 404 of FWPCA is a regulatory statute concerned with discharges of dredged and 
fill material in those waters which are within the reach of congressional authority. This article 
concentrates on the relationship between Section 404 and discharges of dredged and till 
material in wetland areas, and analyzes the legal process whereby such discharges came to 
be regulated under Section 404. For purposes of the ensuing analysis, an important distinction 
must be drawn between two separate activities which impact upon water quality - direct 
discharges of pollutants, on the one hand, and hydrologic modification, such as altering 
wetland areas by discharges of dredged or fill material, on the other hand. Both activities 
result in the diminution of water quality, yet in the case of discharging dredged or fill material 
in wetland areas there are further ramifications resulting from the alteration or destruction 
of the delicate ecosystem of an important natural resource. 
Section 404 by its terms focuses on the impacts upon water quality resulting from the 
discharge of dredged or fill material, whether the activity occurs in wetlands or in other water 
areas. Succinctly stated, it is a dredged spoil and fill material statute. However, the effects 
of discharging dredged and fill material in areas other than wetlands are considered only in 
passing. 
Finally, in reviewing the development of Section 404 as a means of protecting wetlands, 
many issues related to the protection of wetlands by the law are only tangentially reviewed. 
Where other commentators have more fully discussed issues that are beyond the scope of this 
article, their works are cited. Since the legal process of central concern here is multi-levelled 
and of many facets, this article focuses only upon major components. 
11 An interesting account of perched wetlands and an economic analysis of the competing 
interests involved in preservation versus use for agriculture is found in J. GOLDSTEIN, COMPETI-
TION FOR WETLANDS IN THE MIDWEST: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1971). 
II For an illustrated, comprehensive explanation of the different types of wetland areas see 
Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 68-90 (Testimony and Briefing Supplement to Testimony 
of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks). 
17 The task of definition is generally approached from the point of view of vegetative index, 
in conjunction with saturated earth. This method, however, will not cover areas such as 
mudflats, where no growth is present, but which are nevertheless important to hydrological 
cycles. 
While the word "wetlands" itself would seem simply to cover lands which are wet, speciti-
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the just recent concern of the law with wetlands, but also because 
scientists themselves are unable to agree as to which criteria ought 
to be employed for purposes of generic identification. Various disci-
plines urge alternatively that the degree of inundation, the duration 
of inundation and the presence of vegetation should serve as proper 
guidelines. 18 
The problem of exact definition remains troublesome but resolu-
tion is important, for the legal framework demands catagorization 
of wetlands as land or water. If categorized as the former, regulation 
of uses and activities therein is considered land use control; if the 
latter, prohibitions and conditions on discharges into wetlands are 
under the auspices of water pollution control.19 Yet, as seasons 
change and water levels rise and recede, the attempt to neatly cate-
gorize wetlands for purposes of legal analysis becomes futile. 
Of more importance then, is recognition by the law that water 
moves in hydrological cycles,20 and that an inherent relationship 
exists among all water-related resources. Whether or not wetlands 
fit any discrete legal category, they are important natural resources 
intimately involved with water quality and should perhaps be af-
forded sui generis status.21 
B. The Value of Wetlands 
Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in determining the 
exact parameters of wetland areas, there is no doubt that they are 
valuable natural resources. 22 An incomplete list of their known func-
city becomes very important for any regulatory effort. See the attempts at definition by the 
Corps of Engineers, at notes 176 and 213, infra. 
18 See, e.g., Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 316-17. 
" Some jurisdictions maintain distinctions in considering the "reasonableness" of a state's 
use of its police powers depending on the purpose of regulation. See Note, Wetlands Regula-
tion: The "Taking" Problem and Private Property Interests, 12 URB. L. ANN. 301 (1976) and 
articles and cases cited therein. 
20 "Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be 
controlled at the source." S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Congo 1st Sess. 77, reprinted in [1972] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3668, 3742. 
21 State legislation regarding wetlands can take this approach, since regulation is based 
upon police powers which may be applied broadly to protect the public health, safety, welfare 
and morals. See, e.g., Sibson V. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975). The federal govern-
ment, on the other hand, is not endowed with a general police power and therefore must 
attempt to reach activities in wetlands through its other powers, most notably the Commerce 
Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Soper, The Constitutional Framework of 
Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (E. Dolgin and T.G.P. Guilbert, eds. 
1974). See also note 14, supra. 
" See generally Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 73-90, 415-23, 467-79. 
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tions includes: water purification and regeneration,23 flood control, 24 
habitat25 and food source. 28 Biologists have long recognized the in-
trinisc value of wetlands to flora and fauna. Chemists have more 
recently begun to appreciate wetlands, studying, through hydrologi-
cal analysis, the ability of wetlands to buffer aquatic ecosystems 
from the inroads of pollution. In fact, scientists predict that quanti-
tative cost-benefit analysis of the purification abilities of wetlands 
may soon be available. 27 
Not to be overlooked is the aesthetic value of many wetland areas. 
Because they provide food and shelter to animals and rich soil to 
vegetation, wetlands attract a variety of insects, birds, mammals 
and fish, while fostering the growth of many types of plants and 
trees. As isolated laboratories, wetlands provide an ideal place 
within which to observe the workings of nature. 
C. The Need for Wetlands Protection 
The increasing awareness of the value of wetlands has not, in and 
23 The tremendous regenerative capacity of wetlands is still in the early stages of study. 
See id. at 467-70 (Supplemental article, E. Odum, Pricing the Natural Environment); See 
also Delmore & Wood, Savannah River Improvement and Environmental Preservation, J. 
LAND ECON. 284 (1974) (10,000 acres of wetlands near Savannah, Georgia worth 46.5 million 
dollars as a waste treatment facility for river water and for aquifer). 
" Wetlands function as giant sponges during periods of high water, slowly releasing water 
as flood levels recede. The 1978 report of the Council on Environmental Quality contained 
this revealing account: 
A system of natural wetlands was incorporated into a large regional flood control project 
in the Charles River basin in Massachusetts. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded 
after a five-year study that flooding problems in this river basin could best be resolved 
by maintaining 8,500 acres of wetlands in their natural state in perpetuity. The Corps 
calculated an annual flood control value for these wetlands of $1,203,000 or $142 per acre. 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 319-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT, 
1978]. 
2. Migratory waterfowl are dependent upon wetlands for food and shelter, especially along 
their flight lines. Many species of fur-bearing animals, such as beaver, muskrat, lynx, otter 
and fisher are found in the confines of swamps and marshes. Two out of every three species 
of Atlantic fish depend in some way upon tidal lands and water for survival. See generally 
Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 68-90; CEQ REpORT, 1978, supra note 24, at 315-18. 
28 Wetlands function as a vital source to the food chain, not only by fostering the growth 
of lesser species and offspring but also by providing nutrition directly. 
The common cattail is representative of the food production capacity of wetlands. The 
cattail can produce 30-60 times as much flour per acre as wheat, and far outstrips corn and 
rice in food value. Additionally, the cattail produces vegetables between October and mid-
June, thus yielding fresh vegetables out-of-season. Walker, Our Neglected Food Source, 
COUNTRY J. 48 (Feb. 1976). 
27 See generally Delmore & Wood, supra note 23. 
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of itself, altered the serious problem of wetlands destruction. 2K Three 
factors are especially responsible for continued pressures on wet-
lands: (1) the tremendous demand for real estate generally; (2) the 
demand for water-related facilities such as docks and marinas, as 
well as canals to connect them with water bodies; and (3) the rela-
tive ease with which a wetland can be permanently destroyed. 
As communities grow and solid land is utilized, wetland areas 
often become either the only available or the least expensive prop-
erty near centers of commercial development. 29 Thus, wetlands be-
come attractive to those who seek sites for either residential or com-
mercial construction because of the economic value and potential 
marketability of such proximity. Furthermore, planners considering 
the prospective routes of highways, utility lines and other facilities 
recognize that less resistance will be encountered bisecting a neg-
lected swamp than a suburban development. 
Drainage, dredging and fill procedures rapidly transform a thriv-
ing wetland area into acreage ready for construction. The resultant 
destruction of the delicate ecology of a wetland is seldom reversi-
ble.30 Furthermore, even if the transformation of a wetland does not 
encompass the entire area of saturated soil, but is accomplished in 
a piecemeal fashion or incrementally by bulkheading a part of a 
wetland and then filling in behind the barriers, this partial en-
croachment also interferes with important water cycles and can 
upset the delicate balance of an area. 31 
Air and water pollution have direct, tangible effects. Noxious 
odors, oil-slicked streams, dead fish and disease serve as constant 
reminders of such abuses. However, the effects of destroying a wet-
land are not always obvious or immediate, and the connection be-
tween interfering with a wetland area and diminution of water qual-
ity, flooding or the disappearance of a species of fish is not always 
28 Wetlands are indeed endangered. Although estimates vary, there is general agreement 
that 50 percent of the nation's wetlands have been destroyed in the last two centuries, see 
CEQ REpORT, 1978, supra note 24, at 315, citing a Fish and Wildlife Service study which 
concluded that of an original 127 million acres of wetlands in the lower 48 states, only 87 
million acres remained in 1954. It estimated that by 1971 another 17 million acres had been 
lost, with only 70 million remaining . 
.. See Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 113. 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 156-57 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), vacated in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). 
31 Minor projects on the periphery of wetland areas are not usually as destructive as major 
projects, but the frequency of such inroads is significant and cumulatively such minor pro-
jects become a major problem. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,131 (1977). 
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readily recognized. Indeed, the cumulative impact of excessive en-
croachment might never produce results in the immediate area of a 
destroyed wetland but could instead manifest itself at lower eleva-
tions in a watershed.32 
Public awareness of the causal relationship between wetlands de-
struction and environmental imbalance has thus been impeded by 
the subtlety and remoteness of the impact of converting wetlands 
to dry lands. While convincing the public and private sectors of the 
need for protection of wetlands has been difficult, much has been 
accomplished.33 
D. The Development by States of Wetlands Protection 
In response to civilization's encroachment upon vital wetland 
areas, a complex array of state regulatory legislation has appeared 
in the past decade. Following the lead of Massachusetts,34 several 
states responded to the lobbying efforts of environmentally con-
cerned citizens by enacting comprehensive wetlands protection 
schemes.35 
Those states which have effected wetlands protection have gener-
ally done so by means of a review process varying in detail depend-
ing upon the scope and impact of the proposed project. The review 
process is accomplished through a permitting system, whereby ac-
tivities affecting wetlands are prohibited unless a permit is obtained 
from the proper authority.3. This approach has two advantages: 
32 See Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 340, 500·01. 
33 See text at notes 245·46, infra . 
.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105; ch. 131, §§ 40, 40A (West 1979) (as amended in 
1975). The original legislation protecting coastal wetlands (ch. 130, § 105) was enacted in 
1965. Inland wetlands were the subject of legislation in 1967 . 
.. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a·28 to ·45 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 6601·6620 
(1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43·2401·2413 (1978); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 471·478 (1978); MD. 
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 9·101 to ·501 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13, 9A·1 to ·10 (1979); N.Y. 
ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24·0101 to ·1303, 25·101 to ·602 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113·229 
to ·230 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAw ANN. § 11·46.1·1 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 62.1·13.1 to ·13.20 (1978). 
The Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia statutes also 
contain statements of public policy. In general, these statutes all contain similar provisions 
which define wetlands, establish procedures for applying for permits allowing projects to be 
undertaken in or near wetlands, empower an agency to both review applications and enforce 
the statute and establish judicial review. 
3. Permitting is to some extent a term of art which assumes the following: (1) absolute 
prohibition of an activity unless a permit is obtained; (2) application for a permit with the 
requirement that information regarding the proposed activity be submitted; (3) a review 
process by an administrative authority, resulting in a decision to grant or deny a permit; and 
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first, it allows permitting authorities to attach conditions while still 
approving the project; second, the review process educates the ap-
plicant as to the potential impact of the proposed project and 
thereby demonstrates the need for caution. In some cases, water 
quality, flooding and other considerations compel outright denial of 
a permit application. 
The advent of prohibitions against and conditions upon dredging 
and filling wetlands has impeded the rapid rate of destruction. The 
delay, inconvenience and expense encountered in the administra-
tive review process may have often motivated those wishing to un-
dertake projects to avoid wetlands entirely in favor of alternative 
sites. Inevitably, however, the state's exercise of its police power in 
order to protect health, safety, and welfare by regulating and pro-
hibiting uses of wetlands has conflicted with private rights in prop-
erty. Landowners, developers and others have challenged wetlands 
regulations on the grounds that the state, in essence, is taking pri-
vate property without compensation, in violation of state constitu-
tional provisions and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.37 While case law is still developing, environ-
mental commentators favorably report a trend toward judicial will-
ingness to uphold state regulatory efforts after balancing public 
health, safety and welfare considerations against ownership rights. 38 
(4) if a permit is granted, certain conditions may be listed which must be followed when 
performing the activity. See text at notes 86-89, infra. 
37 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; see State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Potomac Sand 
& Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358,293 A.2d 241 (1972). See also cases cited 
at note 38, infra. 
38 Analysis of the "taking" issue is necessarily beyond the scope of this article. For consider-
ation of the issue, see generally Note, Wetlands Regulation, supra note 19; see also Ablard 
and O'Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. L. REV. 51, 106-108 (1976). For cases 
evincing the favorable trend, see Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (denial 
of a permit to fill a wetland held a valid exercise of police power notwithstanding substantial 
reduction in value of owner's land). Accord, Just v. Marienette County, 56 Wisc. 2d 7, 201 
N.W.2d 761 (1972) which contains this oft-cited language: 
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not picturesque. 
But as the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired that swamps 
and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are essential 
to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary 
part of the ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their own beauty 
in nature. 
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change its nature to suit 
any of his purposes? The great forests of our state were stripped on the theory man's 
ownership was unlimited. But in forestry, the land at least was used naturally, only the 
natural fruit of the land (the trees) were taken. The despoilage was in the failure to look 
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States undertaking wetlands regulatory efforts have generally 
been those identified as liberal or noted for their environmental 
legislation, and are largely confined to the Northeast. As late as the 
early 1970's, when the United States Congress was debating the 
desirability of developing a strong federal water pollution program, 
vast acres of wetlands in the midwestern, southern, and western 
states remained unprotected. This situation in the field of wetlands 
protection was symptomatic of a larger national water pollution 
problem - the inability of the separate states to cope with their 
water pollution problems. States attempting to abate the pollution 
of water resources were frustrated by the absence of controls in 
neighboring states.3D The fact that water moves in hydrological cy-
cles irrespective of political boundaries along with the continued 
diminution of water quality nationally pointed to the need for an 
effective, wide-scale federal program to institute control strategies. 
Therefore, against this backdrop of failure by the states, Congress 
recognized that water pollution control required a federal presence 
in an area traditionally regarded as within the purview of state 
authority. 
The demonstrated importance of wetlands in the hydrological 
cycle would seem to have been significant enough, in and of itself, 
to attract congressional response. However, such was not the case, 
at least not explicitly. Section 404 of FWPCA of 1972, which does 
not even mention wetlands,40 became the basis of a federal regula-
tory program protecting wetlands from destruction by dredging and 
filling. In order to understand how Section 404 evolved into a wet-
lands protection statute, an historical perspective is necessary.41 
to the future and provide for the reforestation of the land. An owner of land has no absolute 
and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it 
for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of 
others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is 
not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting 
the use of private property to its natural uses. 
[d. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768 (emphasis added). 
" See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (effluent discharge in Wisconsin 
waters allegedly created a nuisance in waters of Illinois). 
.. See text of Section 404, supra note 6. 
" The historical perspective presented in the following section of this article is not intended 
to be a detailed analysis of the relationship between the term navigable waters in its historical 
sense and wetlands protection by the federal government, although tangential consideration 
is inevitable. Instead, the purpose of reviewing the expansion of the power of Congress to 
regulate activities affecting waters is to introduce the reader to dynamic forces of history 
which were not clearly in focus at the time of congressional consideration of comprehensive 
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ID. THE POWER TO REGULATE: CONFUSION IN NAVIGABLE WATERS 
The power of Congress to reach activity polluting waters was in a 
confused state in the early 1970'S.42 Although water pollution was 
recognized as a federal problem and the interstate movement of 
water in hydrological cycles provided an apparent nexus to the 
Commerce Clause powers of Congress, events which preceded the 
enactment of FWPCA of 1972 obfuscated the issue of congressional 
authority to regulate directly activity which diminished water qual-
ity. These events, and the confusion they spawned, contributed to 
the remarkable evolution of Section 404. 43 
A. Initial Federal Regulation of the Nation's Waters 
The authority of the federal government over certain waters in the 
United States was first expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Gibbons v. Ogden,44 wherein the Supreme Court held that the con-
stitutional grant to regulate commerce45 necessarily involved the 
regulation of navigation. This recognition of federal rights estab-
lished the framework for future analysis: congressional regulatory 
authority attached to navigable waterways through the Commerce 
Clause. The Court confronted the problem of defining the extent of 
such waters in The Daniel Ball,48 an admiralty case arising in 
connection with the Great Lakes. Rejecting the admiralty definition 
of the English c6mmon law which limited navigable waters to those 
"subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, "47 the Court concluded that 
navigable waters are those that are "navigable in fact, "48 and are so 
defined when they are "used or susceptible to being used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce . . . . "49 The Court 
reaffirmed this basic definition in 1874, specifically stating that 
navigable waters included waterways with the capability or poten-
water pollution control legislation in the early 1970's, but later emerged to contribute sub-
stantially to the development of Section 404 . 
.. See generally Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 682, 687-93 (T.G.P. Guilbert & E.L. Dolgin eds., 1974). 
" See text at notes 84-86, infra . 
.. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
" U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) . 
.. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
" [d. at 563. For a case which used this admiralty definition see The Thomas Jefferson, 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) . 
•• 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) . 
.. [d. 
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tial for public use as a route in interstate commerce.50 
Congressional authority to regulate waterways thus depended on 
the resolution of a factual issue - whether a waterway was used or 
capable of use in interstate commerce. In 1865 the Supreme Court 
decided Gilman v. Philadelphia, 51 and stated that congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause "necessarily includes the 
power to keep [navigable waters] open and free from anyobstruc-
tion to their navigation. . . to remove such obstructions when they 
exist; and to provide . . . such sanctions as they deem proper 
• • • • "52 Congress did not respond immediately to this offer to exer-
cise authority. Yet in 1888, when the Court held in Willamette Iron 
Bridge Co. v. Hatch53 that absent a specific congressional sanction 
the construction of a bridge obstructing navigable waters would not 
be enjoined, 54 Congress responded with legislation addressing the 
problem.1I5 A compilation and revision of these efforts resulted in the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.58 
B. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: Judicial Expansion of the 
Scope of Navigable Waters 
The implementation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 accel-
erated the development of the doctrine of navigable waters. 
Through the Act Congress asserted jurisdiction over specific activi-
ties affecting the navigability of the nation's waterways. Sections 9, 
10 and 13 are of central concern and are all in force today in slightly 
modified forms. 57 
Section 9 of the Act was designed to dispose of the problems 
presented in Willamette. The construction of bridges, dams and 
causeways obstructing navigable waters was outlawed absent spe-
cific congressional consent. Section 10 prohibited the unauthorized 
obstruction or alteration of any navigable water of the United 
States. Obstruction and alteration were broadly defined to include 
50 The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874). 
,I 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865). 
'2 [d. at 725 (dicta). 
53 125 U.S. 1 (1888). 
54 "There must be a direct statute of the United States in order to bring within the scope 
of its laws ... obstructions and nuisances in navigable streams .... " [d. at 8 . 
•• Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 10; 26 Stat. 426, 454-55. 
.. Act of May 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 112l. 
.7 The current versions of Sections 9, 10, and 13 are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 
(1976). The modifications are general adjustments for governmental reorganization; for exam-
ple, for purposes of the statute, the Secretary of War is now the Secretary of the Army. 
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excavation or depositing of materials (dredging and filling) in such 
waters, or any work affecting the course, location, condition or ca-
pacity of such waters. These activities could be undertaken only 
with the authorization of the Secretary of War. The focus of concern 
was the maintenance of navigability and the supervision of projects 
that might impair navigation. Section 13, referred to as the Refuse 
Act, prohibited the discharge of refuse into waters without a permit 
from the Secretary of War. In enacting this provision, Congress 
extended its regulatory power to activity occurring outside the con-
fines of navigable waters themselves, for Section 13 also prohibited 
discharges into tributaries of navigable waters as well as the place-
ment of refuse in land areas if either activity might cause refuse to 
reach navigable waters.58 
The development of new uses of waterways, such as hydro-electric 
power generation, and the application of the sanctions of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act to these activities, led to an expansion of the doc-
trine of navigable waters, although the doctrine remained tied to the 
Commerce Clause. In 1921 the Supreme Court decided Economy 
Light & Power Co. v. United States59 and created the concept of 
indelible navigability, that is, once a waterway has been used as a 
route in interstate commerce it retains its identification as naviga-
ble despite subsequent alterations of watercourse, commercial ca-
pacity, or economic conditions of surrounding areas. 60 Therefore, 
58 A decision under a precursor of Section 10 in the same year as the enactment of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899 provided judicial precedent for this regulation. In United States v. 
Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) the Court approved the injunction 
sought by the United States to halt the diversion of water from non-navigable tributaries of 
the Rio Grande because such use affected the navigability of the Rio Grande itself. The Court 
analogized: 
[I]f the State of New York should, even at a place above the limits of navigability, by 
appropriations for any domestic purposes, diminish the volume of waters, which, flowing 
into the Hudson, make it a navigable stream, to such an extent as to destroy its navigabil-
ity, undoubtedly the jurisdiction of the National Government would arise and its power 
to restrain such appropriation would be unquestioned. . . . 
[d. at 709. This reasoning has been extended to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 
See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Weisz man v. 
District Engineer, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Moretti, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th 
Cir. 1976). 
50 256 U.S. 113 (1921) . 
•• [d. at 123-24. Indelible navigability is sometimes referred to as the historic test of naviga-
bility. This test has presented some thorny cases to judges, as in James River & Kanawha 
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973), aiI'd, 
481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) wherein the federal district court rejected a claim that federal 
jurisdiction extended to a downtown parking lot that had been the site of a canal used in 
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despite the fact that in the Economy Light case the particular body 
of water was obstructed and no longer used for commerce, the his-
torical use of the river rendered it navigable for purposes of federal 
regulation, and Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
precluded construction of a dam without specific congressional au-
thorization. 
Finally, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power CO.,81 the 
Court completed the spectrum of the "-classical" or "traditional" 
definition of navigable waters, holding that if reasonable improve-
ments could effect navigability, such waters were within the pur-
view of federal jurisdiction.82 Thus, by applying the specific prohibi-
tions of the Rivers and Harbors Act to areas beyond those waters 
actually used in navigation, the Supreme Court recognized a broad 
congressional authority to regulate activities in water areas of the 
United States. The touchstone of the doctrine of navigable waters, 
however, was still navigation, just as the specific concern of the 1899 
Act had been the prevention of obstructions to the navigable capac-
ity of waterways. 
By 1940 navigable waters encompassed those waters which were 
presently, had been previously, or with reasonable improvements 
might be made suitable for navigation in interstate commerce.83 The 
determination of navigability remained a question of fact. Once a 
determination of navigability was made, however, another issue 
presented itself in some contexts: a determination of the shoreward 
limit of the territorial expanse of federal authority had to be made.84 
The Court resolved this issue by reference to the high water mark85 
of water bodies, the point traditionally employed to separate public 
interstate commerce in 1880. "Quite simply, it ceased to exist as a waterway." 359 F. Supp. 
at 640 . 
• 1 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
12 [d. at 408. 
II This summary of federal jurisdiction over waterways is the "traditional" or "classical" 
definition of navigable waters and will be referred to frequently as such. It is unclear exactly 
what happened to the old common law approach of waters subject to tidal action, though it 
seems clear that it is still viable in certain circumstances. Regulations published in 1972 
pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act incorporated this test into the definition of navigable 
waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 290-260(k)(2) (1975). The Third Circuit has upheld this guide, United 
States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) 
("In tidal waters the test in our view remains what it was before 1851, the ebb and flow of 
the tide." [d. at 610). See also text at note 276, infra . 
.. Riparian owners needed to know at what point activities on or near the banks of naviga-
ble waters would be subject to federal regulation. 
I' United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967). 
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ownership and use of water and submerged land from private use 
and ownership of fast land.88 In tidal areas, the Court deemed the 
high tide line to be the territorial limit of federal regulatory author-
ity,87 
Expressing this territorial expanse of the authority of Congress in 
traditional property terms, the Court has referred to a "dominant 
navigational servitude" running to the benefit of the federal govern-
ment. As stated in F.P. C. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,6K "we 
recognize the dominant servitude, in favor of the United States, 
under which private persons hold physical properties obstructing 
waters of the United States and all rights to use the water of those 
streams."8g Therefore, the rights of the United States are paramount 
to the possessory interest of individuals in the area of navigable 
waters. Summarizing the shoreward reach of this servitude, Justice 
White explained in United States v. Rands70 that "the navigational 
servitude of the United States does not extend above the high water 
mark."71 
While the boundary of the high water mark defined the extent of 
the navigational servitude, a distinction was made between regula-
tion of activity affecting the area of the navigational servitude and 
federal rights in the area itself. The assertion of jurisdiction by 
Congress in enacting Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act did 
not conflict with the judicial limitation of the area of navigable 
waters, inasmuch as the section regulated activity outside the servi-
tude in order to protect waters within the servitude. The high water 
mark and the high tide line, therefore, only provided a boundary to 
.. See generally Gay, The Iligh Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 
18 U. FLA. L. REV. 553 (1966) and cases cited therein. 
" Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935). Most states use 
the mean high water mark or mean high tide line to separate private ownership and use of 
land bordering on navigable waters from public ownership and use of the water and sub-
merged land. See Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a 
Citadel Under Siege, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 19, 23 (1973); see also Gay, supra note 66 . 
.. 347 U.S. 239 (1954) . 
.. [d. at 249. See also United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 
(1913); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
The Federal Government has domination over the water power inherent in the f10wing 
stream. It is liable to no one for its use or non-use. The flow of a navigable stream is in no 
sense private property .... Exclusion of riparian owners from its benefits without com-
pensation is entirely within the Government's discretion. 
[d. at 424. 
7. 389 U.S. 121 (1967). 
71 [d. at 123. 
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the areas subject to federal rights, while Congress could legislate to 
reach activity beyond the confines of navigable waters.72 
C. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: Erosion of the High 
Water Mark Boundary 
The authority to authorize construction activities in navigable 
waters which Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
vested in the Secretary of War was delegated to the Army Corps of 
Engineers/3 Initially, the Corps limited its jurisdiction to activity 
affecting the navigable capacity of waterways, reviewing permit 
applications on the .basis of impact upon navigation and allowing 
work where no adverse impact would ensue.74 However, as a belated 
response to a provision in the 1958 amendments to the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act,75 the Corps developed a "public interest 
review" which went beyond the confines of the 1899 Act's concern 
with navigability.78 In 1968 the Corps published the following regu-
lation: "The decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest 
72 The doctrine of navigable waters defines an area in a spatial sense, while the nexus of 
the doctrine to the Commerce Clause provides Congress with a much broader authority to 
regulate activities. The Supreme Court summarized this relationship while rejecting an argu-
ment that the Federal Power Commission could grant a license for a private dam on a 
navigable river subject to conditions not related to navigation: 
By navigation respondent means no more than operations of boats and improvements on 
the waterway itself. In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of com-
merce on its waters. Navigability, in the sense just stated, is but a part of this whole. Flood 
protection, watershed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through utiliza-
tion of power are likewise parts of commerce control. . . . [The 1 authority is as broad 
as the needs of commerce. 
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940). See also note 58, 
supra. 
73 The Army Corps of Engineers, first established in 1802, is a branch of the United States 
Army. Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, §§ 26-29, 2 Stat. 132, 137. Initially involved only in the 
construction of coastal fortifications, as the United States expanded westward during the 
nineteenth century the Corps became more involved in the development of commercial water-
ways. Following enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps clearly became the 
guardians of navigable waters. As this article indicates, the traditional role of the Corps in 
the construction, operation and maintenance of civil works projects for navigation, flood 
control, water resources and other purposes has been supplemented with an environmental 
role. See text at note 148-159, infra. 
At present the Army Corps of Engi,!eers comprises the world's largest engineering firm, 
reflected by the fiscal 1974 budget request of $1,479 million for the Corps civil works program. 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 345, U.S. Gov't Printing Office. See generally 
Hoyer, supra note 67. 
,. See Hoyer, supra note 67, at 25. 
75 Pub. L. No. 85-624 § 2, 72 Stat. 563, 564 (1958) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 662 (1976». 
" 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1968). 
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on an evaluation of all relevant factors, including the effect of the 
proposed work on navigation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollu-
tion, aesthetics, ecology and the general public interest .... "77 
Thus the Corps, by regulation, expanded the scope of concern of the 
1899 Act to many considerations other than navigability.7K 
However, the Corps accepted the high water mark as the absolute 
limit of its physical jurisdiction under Section 10 and required no 
permits for even massive dredging and filling projects above this 
line. 78 The legal basis for this limit began eroding, however, as courts 
gradually realized that work done above the line might violate Sec-
tion 10 if the activity altered or modified the course, condition or 
location of navigable waters.80 This realization, particularly if fur-
ther extended, was of importance for the protection of wetlands, 
which often fell above the mean high water mark but nonetheless 
were hydrologically connected with adjacent water bodies. However, 
the Corps did not actively seek such an interpretation of Section 
10.81 While the Corps did assert jurisdiction over wetlands falling 
77 [d. 
78 The Public Interest Review has become a requirement of law for any Corps permit 
program. In 1970, a report of the House Committee on Government Operations advocated 
that the Corps "increase its consideration of the effects the proposed work will have, not only 
on navigation, but also on conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and water 
quality, aesthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other public interest aspects of 
the waterway." HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 
917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). 
The Fifth Circuit in 1970 held that when the House Report, the amendments to the Fish 
and Wildlife Coordination Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4321-4347 (1976) were considered together, "there is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse 
on conservation grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act." Zabel v. Tabb, 
430 F.2d 199, 214 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
The court in Zabel further stated that "the Secretary must weigh the effect a dredge and 
fill project will have on conservation before he issues a permit .... " [d. at 211, accord United 
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). 
" See 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.260(j),(k)(1976) . 
.. See, e.g., United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964) (overloading 
of land causing underlying soil to block channel held violative of Section 10); Hoyer, supra 
note 67, and cases cited therein. The question devolves as follows: does the reference to 
navigable waters in Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act connote a spatial or causal 
relationship? Since the enactment of FWPCA, courts have been more willing to accept a 
causal relationship. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton Coves Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (upholding Corps jurisdiction over inland canals, the excavation of which would 
alter or modify nearby navigable waters.) 
81 The growing awareness of the value and importance of wetlands and the incorporation 
of the "ebb and flow of the tide" test into the scope of navigable waters by some courts, see 
note 63, supra, has more recently led to increased use of Section 10 for the protection of tidal 
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below the mean high water line when activity in those areas affected 
the navigability of an adjacent water body, the limitation of the 
mean high water line and the lack of desire on the part of the Corps 
to become guardian of all wetland areas adjacent to navigable wa-
ters dissuaded the Corps from more extensive regulation.82 Thus, 
Section 10, even in conjunction with the Corps' public interest re-
view, did not afford adequate protection from dredging and filling 
to wetlands. 
While an examination of the application of Section 10 demon-
strates the inapplicability of the doctrine of navigable waters to 
effective wetlands protection because of the limit of the mean high 
water line, Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, by its own 
language, reached beyond the navigational servitude.83 However, a 
review of the application of Section 13 will reveal not only the in-
applicability of the historical doctrine of navigable waters to the 
area of pollution control, but will also, in part, explain the underly-
ing confusion concerning the regulatory authority of Congress which 
attended the enactment of FWPCA. 
D. Recycling Statutes: Section 13 Becomes the Refuse Act Permit 
Program 
Unlike Section 10, which had frequently been applied by the 
Corps, Section 13 was largely ignored following its enactment. How-
ever, just as the evolving environmental consciousness of the 1960's 
had impelled the broader application of the prohibitions of Section 
10 and consideration of factors other than navigability in reviewing 
permit applications,84 so too was Section 13 revitalized as a potential 
weapon against industrial pollution.85 Despite the obvious concern 
of Section 13 with obstructions to navigation, the scope of its prohi-
bition against the disposal of refuse in navigable waters and their 
tributaries ironically transformed Section 13 from a navigational 
preservation statute of the laissez faire McKinley administration 
marshes. See generally Kramon, Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence 
of a New Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REv. 229 (1973). 
12 See text at notes 142-44, infra. For a discussion of the Corps' self-imposed jurisdictional 
limits, see Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REv. 503, 513-21 (1977). 
os See text at notes 57-58, supra. 
114 See text at notes 75-81, supra. 
81 An account of the development of this program is presented in J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up 
AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE EPA, 98-111 (1976). 
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into the statutory basis of the first federally administered permit 
program designed for water pollution control. This program became 
known as the Refuse Act Permit Program (RAPP). The impetus for 
this transformation was found in significant dictum stated by Jus-
tice Douglas to the effect that the term "refuse" as used in the 
Rivers and Harbors Act was broad enough to cover industrial 
wastes.8ft 
The scheme of RAPP was to utilize Section 13 as a ban upon 
discharges of industrial pollutants into navigable waters and their 
tributaries. Dischargers were required to obtain permits from the 
Army Corps of Engineers, to whom the Secretary of War's permit-
ting authority was delegated. 87 As in any permit program, the plan 
was not designed to stop all polluting discharges immediately, but 
instead to abate such discharges by interpreting data collected dur-
ing the review of applications for permits. 88 The involvement of the 
Army Corps of Engineers alarmed some environmentalists, since the 
Corps had earned a rather checkered environmental reputation as 
a result of their historical role in construction projects and water 
resource development.89 Nevertheless, the Corps was experienced in 
water matters and had developed permit review procedures in the 
administration of Section 10 of the 1899 Act. By executive order, 
RAPP became effective in 1971.90 
The program, however, was short lived. The optimistic revitaliza-
tion of Section 13 could not overcome the conflict between the scope 
of the pollution control effort and the limitations of the language of 
Section 13. The expansion of the doctrine of navigable waters by the 
Supreme Court did not go far enough to encompass the area neces-
sary for a successful permitting effort. 
In Kalur v. Resor,81 a district court confronted with a challenge 
to the program carefully construed the statute and enjoined the 
operation of RAPP. The court concluded that although Section 13 
might well prohibit the discharge of pollutants into all waters tan-
.8 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489-91 (1960). See also United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). 
87 At the time of the initial development of the Refuse Act Permit Program no procedures 
existed for issuance of permits under Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 
88 See note 38, supra . 
.. In 1969 Justice William O. Douglas labelled the Corps "public enemy number one" of 
the environment. SATURDAY REV., May I, 1971, at 4 . 
.. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 986 (1966-70 compilation). 
" 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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gentially affecting navigable waters, the statute only extended 
permitting authority to cover discharges in navigable waters.92 In 
other words Section 13 prohibited certain discharges for which the 
Corps lacked authority to issue permits. The decision rendered liter-
ally thousands of dischargers in violation of the law, without any 
means of legitimizing their activity through permitting. RAPP was 
not intended to end immediately all discharges; such a simplistic 
solution to water pollution problems would have resulted in disas-
trous economic consequences, halting the productivity of many 
United States industries. RAPP was abandoned as infeasible.93 
The decision in Kalur reaffirmed the Corps conception of their 
statutory mandate as being confined to traditional navigable wa-
ters. While policy decisions of the Corps concerning major projects 
might encompass areas beyond traditional navigable waters under 
the National Environmental Policy Act,94 the demise of RAPP 
seemed to be a clear jndication that their permitting authority was 
confined to the navigational servitude. 
The RAPP initiative did not resolve the issue of whether Congress 
could establish permit programs in any areas beyond the traditional 
limits of navigable waters. Unfortunately, the program had at-
tempted to regulate discharges of pollutants under the authority of 
a nineteenth century law which was based on navigational jurisdic-
tion and led to confusion between the statutory assertion of federal 
authority in territorial jurisdictional terms and the power of Con-
gress to regulate pollution as a federal problem under modern inter-
pretations of the Commerce Clause.95 The innovation of this first 
t2 The conclusion that is drawn from this [statutory J language [it shall not be lawful 
... to discharge ... refuse ... into any tributary of any navigable water ... 
[pJrovided further that the Secretary of the Army may permit the discharge of any 
material above mentioned in navigable waters .... J is that the Corps of Engineers has 
no authority to authorize deposits of refuse matter in non-navigable tributaries of naviga-
ble waterways. 
Id. at 11. 
13 See QUARLES,SUpra note 85, at 98-111 . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976) . 
.. Under modern interpretations of the Commerce Clause activities having even a remote 
effect upon interstate commerce are subject to congressional control through the broad consti-
tutional authority granted Congress to regulate interstate commerce. E.g., Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Since water pollution impacts upon inter-
state commerce, Congress can regulate the activities which cause it. 
In this time of awakening to the reality that we cannot continue to despoil our environ-
ment and yet exist, the nation knows, if the Courts do not, that the destruction of fish 
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regulatory effort was a noble experiment, but nevertheless a practi-
cal failure. 
However, RAPP did explore the means by which a federal regula-
tory mechanism might be implemented. This necessary first experi-
ment provided valuable experience and a model which aided in the 
development of the subsequent federal effort embodied in the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.96 Yet, the 
decision in Kalur, as noted above, affected the Corps' conception of 
its authority and, as will be discussed,97 later emerged to obfuscate 
the issues in a debate over jurisdiction between the Corps and EPA. 
IV. THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1972: CREATION OF SECTION 404 
A. From RAPP to NPDES 
At the time of the decision in Kalur, Congress was conducting 
oversight and legislative hearings to determine the best approach for 
restructuring and strengthening the weak water pollution legislation 
then in existence. 98 The result of these efforts was the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA).DD The legisla-
tive history of the Act evinces the intent of Congress to continue the 
permit program approach and to consolidate the necessarily com-
plex administrative procedures into one federal agency, EPA: 
and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some areas a devastat· 
ing, effect on interstate commerce. . . . [D lredge and fill projects are activities which 
may tend to destroy the ecological balance and thereby affect commerce substantially. 
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted) . 
.. See text at notes 98-103, infra. 
" See text at notes 138-47, infra . 
.. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first passed in 1948, Act of June 30, 1948, 
ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, and was subsequently amended several times, see, e.g., Act of July 
17, 1952, ch. 927, 66 Stat. 755, prior to the 1972 Amendments, because of its obvious failure 
to cope with the growing national problem of water pollution. The original Act proceeded on 
the assumption that control of water pollution was primarily the responsibility of the states 
and, while later amendments instituted more substantial enforcement provisions, few results 
were achieved. 
The 1972 Amendments were, in effect, a complete re-writing of the past law, see note 5, 
supra, incorporating some of the techniques of the prior legislative efforts, but establishing a 
much more prominent federal role in the supervision and coordination of pollution control 
strategies. An excellent, concise summary is found in W. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 
4 (1977). See also Zener, supra note 42 . 
.. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 884, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). 
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During the Committee's extensive hearings - oversight and legislative 
- on water pollution control, one question which kept appearing and 
reappearing was the appropriate relationship between the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act and the permit program initiated by the 
Corps of Engineers under the authority of the Refuse Act of 1899. Infor-
mation gathered during the hearings made it abundantly clear that the 
two programs needed to be consolidated and not left each to go in its 
own direction. loo 
FWPCA incorporated the basic purpose of RAPPIUI into an explic-
itly declared congressional goal to "restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."11I2 
Additionally, national goals of swimmable water by 1983 and the 
elimination of all water pollution by 1985 were established. lo3 
Section 301104 of FWPCA outlawed the discharge of any 
"pollutant" from a "point source" into waters of the United States 
unless a permit was obtained. The principal permit mechanism and 
the backbone of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES) was Section 402.105 EPA was vested with authority to 
issue permits allowing the discharge of pollutants subject to effluent 
limitations also established by EPA. However, another tenet of the 
Act was to "recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibil-
ities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution 
[and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources 
"108 
State participation in pollution control efforts was to be achieved 
in several ways, two of which are of critical concern. First, EPA's 
permitting authority could be transferred to the states, subject to 
the requirement that the state have a pollution control agency ap-
proved by EPA to administer the program. I07 While states were free 
to adopt more stringent effluent limitations than those set by EPA, 
EPA retained the right to disapprove weaker standards and to veto 
... H.R. REp. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1972) . 
••• See discussion of RAPP in text accompanying notes 84-97, supra . 
• 02 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) . 
• 03 Id . 
••• Id. § 1311. Section 301(a) (33 U.S.C. § 1311(a» provides that: "Except in compliance 
with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344 of this title, the discharge 
of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 
'16 Id. § 1342 . 
... Id. § 1251(b) . 
• 01 Id. § 1342(b). 
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permit approvals on a case by case basis. lOS 
A second means of promoting state involvement was Section 208 
of FWPCA.IOD Unlike the NPDES program, which was directed spe-
cifically at polluting discharges from "point sources,"110 Section 208 
was primarily concerned with non-point sources of pollution, III a 
much more difficult form of pollution to control. 112 Examples of non-
point source pollution include run-off from urban developments, 
construction sites and agricultural, mining and silvicultural loca-
tions; salt water intrusion into rivers, lakes and estuaries resulting 
from redirection of fresh water flow; and hydrologic modification. 113 
Section 208 provided funding incentivesll4 a:nd established proce-
dures under which states or regional agencies were required to de-
velop regulatory programs to control various types of non-point 
source pollution. 1I5 EPA was to assist state and local governments 
in carrying out their planning responsibilities. 116 
'0' [d. Another device for maintaining federal control over state programs was § 402(c)(3) 
(33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3)). Upon a finding that "a state was not administering a program in 
... compliance with [this section]" EPA could withdraw approval of the state program. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) . 
• 09 [d. § 1288. 
110 See definition of point source in text accompanying note 118, infra. 
II. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1976). 
112 The relegation of "non-point source" pollution control to the states was in large part 
motivated by what one commentator has identified as "the fact that no one has a good idea 
of how federal control over non-point sources of pollution can be achieved." Zener, supra note 
42, at 769. 
A detailed discussion of the problems and methods of controlling "non-point source" pollu-
tion is beyond the scope of this article, although the Section 208 strategy is potentially of great 
importance to wetlands. As one court summarized the purpose of the Section: 
Section 208 charts a course not only for the cleaning up of polluted waters but also for 
the prevention of future pollution by identifying problem sources, regulating construction 
of certain industrial facilities, and developing processes to control runoff sources of pollu-
tion. While Section 208 focuses on "urban-industrial" areas with substantial water control 
difficulties, it also directs attention to other geographical locations with water pollution 
problems, such as forests, mining areas, farms, and salt water inlets. As a "bottom line" 
for the Section 208 waste treatment management activities, the Act prescribes a 1983 goal 
of clean waterways. The period between October 8, 1972 and July, 1976 is mainly a 
planning and development stage. The remaining seven years are for implementing plans 
and eliminating the more difficult and persistent sources of water pollution. 
NRDC v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386, 1389-90 (D.D.C. 1975) (citing EPA WATER QUALITY 
STRATEGY PAPER 10-11 (1974), afi'd sub nom. NRDC v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
The relationship between Section 208 and wetlands protection under Section 404 is dis-
cussed in the text at notes 274-276, infra. See generally Lazarus, Nonpoint Source Pollution, 
2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 176 (1977). 
113 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F)-(l) (1976) . 
• " [d. § 1288(f)(2). 
II. [d. § 1288(b)(1) . 
• 16 [d. § 1288(a)(1). 
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The far-reaching scope of the Act was reflected in the definitions 
of "pollutant" and "point source": 
The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator resi-
due, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, bio-
logical materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded 
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agri-
cultural waste discharged into water. 117 
The term "point source" means any discernible confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe ditch, channel, tun-
nel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated 
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged. liS 
The inclusion of "dredged spoil" and other refuse in the definition 
of pollutant, in conjunction with the broad definition of point 
source, concerned members of the Senate Public Works Committee 
during their review of the proposed drafts of FWPCA.1lD Taken to-
gether, these definitions would expand the scope of FWPCA's 
NPDES program to encompass activities already subject to the per-
mitting authority of the Army Corps of Engineers under Sections 10 
and 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. For example, dredging 
activities in navigable waters would require both an NPDES permit 
from EPA and a Section 10 permit from the Corps of Engineers. 
Because this potential overlap would result in a time-consuming 
review process, possibly stalling many dredging projects and 
thereby interfering with the maintenance of the navigational capac-
ity of waterways and harbors, Congress created Section 404. 120 
117 [d. § 1362(6). 
'" [d. § 1362(14). 
II. See Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 38, at 67-69. 
'20 Ablard and O'Neill survey in detail the legislative history of Section 404, and by refer-
ence to (1) the historical role of the Army Corps of Engineers in administering the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899; (2) the discussions regarding proposed amendments to exempt the Corps 
dredge and fill programs from the NPDES program of § 402; and (3) the overall structure of 
FWPCA and its stated desire to "encourage the drastic minimization of paper work and 
interagency decision procedures ... " 33 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1976) and its affirmative state-
ment that "this chapter shall not be construed as ... (2) affecting or impairing the authority 
of the Secretary of the Army (A) to maintain navigation ... " id. § 1371(a) (1976), conclude 
that "the intent of Section 404 was merely to continue the Corps in its traditional stewardship 
of those waterways subject to navigation." Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 38, at 74. 
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B. Section 404 
At first glance, Section 404 appeared to accomplish its avowed 
purpose of avoiding confusion and redundancy in the areas where 
EPA authority overlapped Corps authority under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899. Subsection (a)121 provided for permitting of 
dredge and fill activities by the Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the Chief of Engineers. Subsections (b) and (C)122 reflected 
a compromise effort to retain EPA oversight of dredging activities 
and their effect on water quality and the environment. Subsection 
(b) provided that the Administrator of EPA, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of the Army, would develop guidelines to assist in the 
selection of disposal sites; however, the Secretary of the Army could 
additionally consider negative impacts on navigation if these guide-
lines prohibited the specification of a site. Under subsection (c) the 
Administrator of EPA was nonetheless vested with a final veto of 
any site selection, if he determined that an adverse impace would 
result upon municipal water supplies, shellfish, fishery areas, wild-
life or recreation areas. Senator Muskie explained the rationale of 
the compromise as follows: 
The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by which the dredge 
and fill permits are presently handled and did not wish to create a 
burdensome bureaucracy in light of the fact that a system to issue 
permits already existed. At the same time, the Committee did not be-
lieve there could be any justification for permitting the Secretary of the 
Army to make determination as to the environmental implications of 
either the site to be selected or the specific spoil to be disposed of in a 
site. Thus, the Conferees agreed that the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency should have the veto over the selection of the 
site for dredged spoil disposal and over any specific spoil to be disposed 
of in any selected site. 123 
The Conferees apparently considered Section 404 to be a restate-
ment of Corps authority under the 1899 Act, modified by the adop-
tion of review procedures focusing on environmental considerations, 
but still recognizing the authority of the Secretary of the Army to 
121 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The text of Section 404 is set forth in note 6, supra. 
122 [d. §§ 1344(b), (c). 
123 See 118 CONGo REc. 33699 (1972) (Exhibit 1 to the Remarks of Senator Muskie) reprinted 
in 2 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 117 (1973). 
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maintain navigational capacity.124 The Corps had always been con-
cerned with navigation, and their authority extended throughout 
traditional navigable waters, as stated by the Court in Kalur v. 
Resor. 25 Whatever expansion of Corps authority was envisioned was 
probably confined to the subjection of federal projects, such as 
Corps dredging activities, to Section 404(b) guidelines and 404(c) 
review. The 1899 Act extended Corps permitting authority only to 
projects undertaken by states and private enterprise. 126 
Drafting peculiarities and oversights, however, wrought a far dif-
ferent result. Disturbingly, Section 404 referred to dredge and fill 
activities, while congressional debate had focused upon the effects 
of dredged spoil only. The term "fill material" was not discussed in 
the legislative history, and neither its meaning nor the reasons for 
including it in the Act were explained.127 Notwithstanding the latent 
ambiguity of the term "fill material," the language that proved 
most divisive and problematical in Section 404 was the term 
"navigable waters."128 If interpreted as traditionally understood in 
light of judicial construction of the 1899 Act,128 the territorial juris-
'21 See Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 38, at 67-80. 
'2' 335 F. Supp. 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1971). 
'20 The Conference Report stated: 
It is expected that until such time as feasible alternative methods for disposal of dredged 
or fill material are available, unreasonable restrictions shall not be imposed on dredging 
activities essential for the maintenance of interstate and foreign commerce. Consistent 
with the intent of this Act, the conferees expect that the disposal activities of private 
dredgers and the Corps of Engineers will be treated similarly. 
COMM. OF CONFERENCE, FEDERAL WATER POLLtmON CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3776, 
3819. Recalling the original intent of Congress in 1972, Senator Muskie stated in 1976: 
Section 404 [was] designed to require the [C]orps, because of their existing authority 
to maintain navigation, to regulate the dumping of polluted dredge spoil at specific dis-
posal sites, the EPA having veto power over the selection of sites. That was the intent 
precisely and specifically stated. 
Section 404 was an exception to an otherwise comprehensive regulatory program embod-
ied in Section 402. But implementation of Section 404 has not led to the elimination of 
open water dredge spoil discharge, which was the specific objective of Section 404. 
Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2. 
'27 Senator Muskie, in 1976, explained the addition: 
The only reason we added the word fill was to make it clear that if the specific disposal 
site agreed upon by the [Army Corps of] [E]ngineers and EPA happened to be on land 
thus taking the form of fill, that there be no ambiguity on the question of whether or not 
it also was covered by Section 404. 
[d. at 62. 
'28 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1976). 
'211 See text at notes 44-83, supra. 
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diction of the Corps remained unaffected, and regulation of dredg-
ing and filling activities would proceed as it had under Section 10 
of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, subject only to the Section 
404(b) guidelines and the Section 404(c) veto power vested in the 
Administrator of EPA. While the scope of Section 10 went beyond 
dredging and filling as a means of altering the course, location or 
condition of navigable waters and included all types of activity 
which might effect such a result, the specific concern of Section 404 
was the diminution of water quality caused by the disposal of 
dredged and fill material. Therefore, while Section 10 and Section 
404 might cover the same activity in some circumstances, such an 
overlap could be explained by the former's concern with navigation 
and the latter's focus upon water quality. 
However, in enacting FWPCA, Congress abandoned the limited 
confines of the doctrine of navigable waters. Despite the fact that 
the term was used, Congress approached the problem of water pollu-
tion as a federal problem under modern judicial interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause. 13o Therefore, in Section 502(7) of the Act, 
Congress explicitly defined "navigable waters" as "waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas."131 While this defini-
tion on its face did not directly overturn prior doctrine, 132 the Joint 
Conference Report's further elucidation of the meaning of 502(7) 
indicates movement away from earlier restrictive definitions: "The 
conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the 
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by 
agency determinations which have been made or may be made for 
administrative purposes."133 Congress seemed to be repudiating the 
traditional definition of navigable waters as set out in administra-
tive regulations of the Corps of Engineers. Representative Dingell, 
an active supporter of the FWPCA in the House, explained the 
conference report: 
130 See note 95, supra. 
131 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976). 
\32 "The omission of the term 'navigable' from the definition of 'navigable waters' bears all 
the earmarks of deliberate ambiguity designed to paper over irreconciled disagreements 
among the conferees over the desired scope of federal jurisdiction." Zener, supra note 42, at 
690-91. See also Comment, Deficiencies in the Regulatory Scheme of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 19 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 208, 212-17 (1974). 
133 S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3822. 
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[T]he conference bill defines the term navigable waters broadly for 
water quality purposes. It means all "waters of the United States" in a 
geographic sense. It does not mean "navigable waters of the United 
States" in the technical sense we sometimes see in some laws .... 
Thus the new definition clearly encompasses all waterbodies, includ-
ing main streams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No 
longer are the old, narrow definitions of navigability, as determined by 
the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters covered by this bill.l:ll 
This definition of navigable waters, applied to Section 404, trans-
formed the section from a restatement of Corps authority to protect 
navigation with the addition of EPA water quality oversight to a 
provision vesting the Corps with responsibility for permitting all 
dredge and fill activities occurring in "waters of the United States." 
Wittingly or unwittingly, Congress vastly expanded the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Corps, placing upon it the burden of supervising 
not only dredging but also filling activities in all waters Congress 
could reach through its Commerce Clause powers. 
The enactment of FWPCA in 1972 brought together the compo-
nents necessary for the creative fashioning of a widescale federal 
wetlands protection scheme. Although the Corps had previously 
134 118 Congo Rec. 33756-57 (1972). The definitions referred to by Congressman Dingell were 
those issued under the Refuse Act Permit Program, reflecting the traditional definition of 
navigable waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1972). 
In construing FWPCA, several courts have mistakenly referred to Congressman Dingell as 
a conferee, see, e.g., United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 672 (M.D. Fla. 1974) and 
have ignored the statements of Senator Muskie linking the term more closely to its traditional 
roots: 
One matter of importance throughout the legislation is the meaning of the term 
"navigable waters of the United States." 
The Conference agreement does not define the term. The Conferees fully intend that 
the term "navigable waters" be given the broadest constitutional interpretation unencum-
bered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for administrative 
purposes. 
Based on the history of consideration of this legislation, it is obvious that its provisions 
and the extent of application should be construed broadly. 
It is intended that the term "navigable waters" include all water bodies, such as lakes, 
streams, and rivers regarded as public navigable water in law which are navigable in fact. 
It is further intended that such waters shall be considered navigable in fact when they 
form, in their ordinary condition by themselves or by uniting with other waters or other 
systems of transportation, such as highways or railroads, a continuing highway over which 
commerce is or may be carried with other States or with foreign countries in the customary 
means of trade and travel in which commerce is conducted today. In such cases the 
commerce on such waters would have a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce. 
118 Congo Rec. 33699 (1972) (Exhibit to the Remarks of Senator Muskie). 
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asserted jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act 
in order to reach dredging and filling activities in wetlands below 
the high water mark,l35 Section 404 extended Corps authority to all 
waters and removed the impediments associated with the doctrine 
of navigable waters. Section 404 explicitly mentioned dredging and 
filling, the most commonly employed techniques for converting wet-
lands to fast land. Whatever Congress originally intended in enact-
ing Section 404, ensuing events vastly altered the role of the Army 
Corps of Engineers. 138 The missing element in the process of convert-
ing Section 404 into a mandatory federal wetlands protection pro-
gram was the incorporation of wetlands within the definition of 
"waters of the United States." Subsequent court decisions accom-
plished this, thereby compelling the Corps to regulate discharges of 
dredged and fill material in wetlands. 
V. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CORPS AND EPA - NRDC v. 
CALLOWAY 
A. A Reluctant Corps of Engineers and An Ambitious EPA 
Following enactment of FWPCA, the Corps and EPA undertook 
the cumbersome process of promulgating regulations under the new 
law. Both agencies faced the tasks of defining the scope of their 
territorial jurisdiction, developing procedures for administering 
their respective permit programs and establishing guidelines to 
apply in the consideration of permit applications. The different 
approaches taken by the Corps and EPA precipitated a debate over 
the meaning of "navigable waters" as used in the Act, and thus 
questioned the scope of Section 404. 
In a proposed regulation published in 1973, the Corps expressed 
an intent to apply its Section 404 mandate to "waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas."137 However, in the final regu-
lation published in 1974 the Corps confined the scope of its terri-
torial jurisdiction to "navigable waters,"138 with the intent of re-
stricting its jurisdiction to those areas covered under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899.131 
13. See text at notes 79-82, supra; see especially note 81, supra. 
'31 See text at notes 137-59, infra. 
137 See 38 Fed. Reg. 12,217, 12,218 (1973); compare 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 12,115 (1974). 
'3' 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 12,115 (1974). 
,3' [d. at 12,117. The Corps limited its jurisdiction to traditional navigable waters as de-
fined in previous Corps regulations. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1973). 
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EPA, meanwhile, had substantially developed the NPDES pro-
gram by the time the Corps regulation was published. EPA defined 
the term "navigable waters" in FWPCA to mean: 
(1) All navigable waters of the United States; 
(2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States; 
(3) Interstate waters; 
(4) Intrastate lakes, rivers and streams which are utilized by interstate 
travellers for recreational or other purposes; 
(5) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shell fish 
are taken and sold in interstate commerce; and 
(6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for in-
dustrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce. I4O 
EPA became concerned with the Corps' reluctance to expand its 
jurisdiction.' Following success in cases where courts upheld EPA's 
far-reaching assertion of jurisdiction under FWPCA,141 the Adminis-
trator expressed his disquiet in a letter to the Chief Engineer of the 
Army Corps: 
Our interpretation of "navigable waters" within the meaning of the 
FWPCA does not conform to the Corps recently issued regulation. We 
firmly believe that the Conference Committee deleted "navigable" from 
the FWPCA definition of "navigable waters" in order to free pollution 
control from jurisdictional restrictions based on "navigability."'~2 
The Administrator expressed particular interest in the protection of 
wetlands. Pointing out that recent court decisions had supported 
EPA's broad definition of jurisdiction, the Administrator lamented 
... 40 C.F.R. § 125.l(p) (1975). 
14' See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. 
Ky. 1973), aII'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Holland, 373 F. 
Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Holland was a prosecution of a land developer under Section 
301(a) of FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976), for failure to obtain a permit before discharg-
ing fill material into non-navigable mosquito canals and mangrove wetland areas. In a de-
tailed opinion tracing the history of the term navigable waters, the court first concluded that 
if the 1899 Act were involved the government would lack jurisdiction over areas above the 
mean high water mark "by the sheer weight of precedent." Id. at 671. However, like the 
court in Ashland Oil, the Holland court concluded that, although the use of the term "navi-
gable waters" in FWPCA "[a)ppears calculated to force courts to engage in verbal acro-
batics," id., the navigability restriction had been "defined away" by Section 502(7). [d. 
The court held that the Act was co-extensive with the Commerce Clause and free of the 
restrictions of the doctrine of navigable waters. It held also that Congress had both the intent 
and the power to reach activities above the high water mark. [d. at 673-74. 
142 Letter from John Quarles to Lt. General William Gribble, Chief of Engineers, June 19, 
1974, reprinted in Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 349, 350. 
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the failure of the Corps to extend its jurisdiction co-extensively with 
EPA's in order to protect wetlands above the mean high water line: 
Notwithstanding [recent decisions], and the recognized importance 
of wetlands to the environment, we have been informed that the Corps 
has declined to acquiesce in [these decisions] and has advised Corps 
installations not to accept applications for permits . . . in these areas. 
The Department of Justice has taken the position that it will not bring 
enforcement action against persons disposing of dredge or fill material 
in wetlands areas without Section 404 permits so long as the Corps 
refuses to issue such permits. As a consequence, wetland areas above the 
mean high water mark are presently unprotected from the irreparable 
damage caused by the disposal of dredged and fill materials. '43 
The Corps was not pursuaded by these arguments. Nor did the 
Corps alter its position after the House Committee on Government 
Operations published a report on October 1, 1974, urging the Corps 
and EPA to develop a uniform regulation consistent with congres-
sional desire that navigable waters "be given the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation."144 The Corps maintained its position 
not only because of inevitable administrative inertia but also be-
cause the Corps conceived of itself as something other than an envi-
ronmental control agency. Historically the Corps had essentially 
two roles: maintenance and protection of navigation in commercial 
waterways, and construction supervision of congressionally author-
ized water resource projects. 145 The scope of the Corps' environmen-
tal concern was limited to the guidelines of an administrative 
"public interest" review which attended the development of pro-
jects and permiD application decisions. u6 The Corps was unwilling 
to broaden the scope of its environmental protection role without 
compulsion. 147 
B. NRDC v. Callaway and Its Aftermath 
In late 1974 the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment compelling the Corps 
143 [d. at 349. 
,,, HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, OUR THREATENED ENVIRONMENT: FLORIDA AND THE 
GULF OF MEXICO. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-27 (1974). 
14. See note 73, supra. 
14' See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f) (1974). EPA did not promulgate Section 404(b) guidelines 
on site selection until September 5, 1975; therefore, site selection under Section 404 before 
this date was guided by the Corps public interest review discussed in note 78, supra. 
14' See N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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to rescind its 1974 regulation and promulgate a new regulation '4H 
properly reflecting the mandate of Section 404 of FWPCA.H9 On 
March 27, 1975 Judge Audrey Robinson granted plaintiff's motion 
for a partial summary judgment, and ordered the revocation and 
recission of that part of the Corps regulation which limited "the 
permit [Section 404] jurisdiction of the Corps by definition or oth-
erwise to other than 'waters of the United States.' "150 
Following the decision in Callaway, the Corps published four al-
ternative proposals and invited public comment. l5l However, the 
Corps simultaneously issued a press release that generated tremen-
dous confusion which afflicted the Section 404 program long after-
ward. The four proposals were shadowed by allegations in the press 
release which suggested that thousands of routine activities by 
farmers, ranchers, foresters and other groups would be subject to 
permit review and its inevitable delay and expense. 152 The press 
release drew outraged comments from agricultural interests which 
impelled farm-block congressmen to act. 
The Administrator of EPA requested the Corps to retract the 
press release publicly,153 and Senator Muskie condemned the action 
from the floor of the Senate. 154 Many of the 4,500 comments received 
from the public responded to the press release and not to the pro-
.. 8 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (1974) . 
... N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) . 
... [d. at 686 . 
• 6. 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766-94 (1975). Alternatives I and II, although requiring state permit 
approval prior to approval by the Corps, placed the decision-making burden on the Corps 
and EPA. Alternatives III and IV placed the burden on the states, with the Corps routinely 
approving all state-endorsed projects unless "overriding national factors of the public inter-
est," id. at 19,768, should dictate otherwise. Environmentalists preferred putting the onus of 
decision-making on the federal agencies, while the Corps wanted the states to assume that 
burden. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full Implementation 
of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENVT'L L. REp. 10,099, 10,102 (1975) . 
•• 2 Press Release, Dep't of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers, May 6, 1975, 
reprinted in Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 517. 
[d . 
Under some of the proposed regulations, Federal permits may be required by the 
rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants to deepen an 
irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to protect his land against 
stream erosion. 
• 13 Letter from Russell Train to Lt. General William C. Gribble, Jr., May 16, 1975, 
reprinted in Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 528. "Because of the extreme importance of 
section 404 as the primary mechanism to protect America's valuable wetland resources, I 
consider it imperative that the Corps of Engineers take steps to remedy these impressions." 
[d . 
... 121 CONGo REc. 17347 (1975). 
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posed alternatives. 155 
The initial furor evoked by the press release attracted congres-
sional attention and, as a result, subcommittees in both the House 
and the Senate held hearings in order to inquire into the Corps' 
allegations. 158 The testimony at these hearings provided a unique 
"legislative history" to the regulation drafting process, and sug-
gested the scope of the effort required to comply with the court's 
order in NRDC u. Callaway. 157 In their testimony, both Assistant 
Secretary of the Army Victor V. Veysey and Assistant EPA Admin-
istrator Alvin AIm assured skeptical congressmen that the Corps 
and EPA had resolved their differences and could properly fashion 
a workable program. 15S Despite some congressmen's contentions that 
the Callaway decision should be appealed, the process of drafting 
the regulation continued and on July 25, 1975 the Corps published 
the regulation, which was entitled "Interim Final" and effective 
immediately. 159 
VI. THE INITIAL REGULATORY PROGRAM 
In drafting and promulgating an interim final regulation the 
Corps attempted to resolve three basic problems presented by the 
district court's order to fully implement the mandate of Section 404 
of FWPCA. First, jurisdiction had to be defined in territorial terms 
in order to clearly delineate the scope of the program. Second, the 
Act's absolute prohibition of the disposal of dredged and fill mate-
rial180 without a permit had to be reconciled with any expansion of 
jurisdiction. Otherwise the program would have had to cope with 
'" See, e.g., Development of New Regulations by the Corps of Engineers, Implementing 
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Concerning Permits for Disposal of 
Dredge or Fill Material: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House 
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 257-92 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as House 404 Hearings, 1975]. 
". See generally id. at 1-256; Development of New Regulations by the Corps of Engineers, 
Implementing Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Concerning Permits 
for Disposal of Dredge or Fill Material: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources 
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
'" See text at notes 161-84, infra. 
'58 See, e.g., House 404 Hearings, 1975, supra note 155, at 2. 
'" 40 Fed. Reg. 31,322-43 (1975), codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1977) (as amended by 41 
Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976)). The identification of the regulation as "Interim Final" referred to 
the fact that the regulation was effective immediately but public comment would continue 
to be received for an additional 90 days, after which time the regulation would be modified, 
if necessary. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975). 
, .. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976). 
1979] WETLANDS PROTECTION 601 
many routine activities involving hydrologic modification,161 even 
though some of these activities were only remotely connected to 
water quality considerations. Such a result would have rendered the 
regulatory effort unmanageable.t62 Finally, procedures had to be 
developed to correlate the detail of administrative review of permit 
applications to the potential severity of hydrological impact of the 
proposed projects and activities. 163 
Beyond these initial problems confronting the drafters of the reg-
ulation was the larger issue of how to implement a suddenly ex-
panded program within existing budgetary and manpower con-
straints. Whatever approaches might resolve the territorial scope 
and subject matter concerns of the enlarged and revtsed Section 404 
program, the actual implementation thereof posed a further chal-
lenge to all Corps personnel. 164 
The 1975 regulation responded to these constraints and the under-
lying problems. Although this specific regulation has been su-
'01 See note 14, supra. 
1f2 As the Department of Agriculture noted: 
literally interpreted, [section 404] means that "navigable waters" ... include tributar-
ies of tributaries of tributaries, etc. to the crest of a watershed divide-indeed to the tiniest 
trickle of surface water resulting from rainfall, snowmelt, or other precipitation. Thus, all 
water and all land area within the watersheds of inland navigable waters of the United 
States would be included. 
Accordingly, if virtually all land, as well as water, areas in the Nation are to be desig-
nated "navigable waters," then the definitions of "dredged" and "fill" material become 
most pertinent to farmers, ranchers, and the general rural sector of the Nation. 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the Senate Comm. on Public Works 
and Transportation, supra note 156, at 56 (Enclosure No.1 to the Dep't of Agriculture's letter 
commenting on the Army Corps of Engineers Proposed Regulations) (emphasis in the origi-
nal). 
While the regulations did not take such an expansive view of navigable waters, the activi-
ties of farmers irrigating, ranchers impounding stock ponds, and foresters crossing streambeds 
had to be considered and a means to exclude routine discharges of dredged and fill material 
with lesser impact upon water quality needed to be developed. 
'13 Ideally, the de'gree of review to which a proposed project is subject ought to correlate 
with the scope and potential impact of the project. The National Environmental Policy Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976) requires detailed review of only "major" federal actions. Id. § 
4332. 
If. A preamble to the 1975 regulation stated: 
We have attempted to create a program that recognizes the need to interweave all con-
cerns of the public - environmental, social, and economic - in the decision-making 
process; that recognizes that present limitations on manpower preclude its immediate 
implementation throughout the country; and that we believe to be responsive to the 
overall objectives and needs of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to the extent that 
the law now allows. 
40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975). 
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perseded,165 consideration of the Corps' initial approach is impor-
tant and relevant for two reasons. First, the regulation satisfied the 
party plaintiff in NRDC v. Callaway l66 and established an accepted 
interpretation of Section 404. Second, the methods and procedures 
utilized provided an effective and reasonable approach to adminis-
tering a federal regulatory program intended to oversee the disposal 
of dredged and fill material in waters and wetlands throughout the 
United States. The 1975 regulaton clearly demonstrated that com-
prehensive wetlands protection could be accomplished. 167 
A. Phased Implementation 
To resolve the larger issue of administering the vastly expanded 
Section 404 program within then existing manpower and budgetary 
constraints the Corps adopted an approach that broadened jurisdic-
tion incrementally in three phases. 188 The phases covered a period 
of two years, allowing the time necessary to recruit personnel and 
establish procedural routines to process permit applications. 
Phase I, operative upon publication, included not only all waters 
within the "classical" definition of navigable waters but also specifi-
cally included "adjacent wetlands," regardless of whether they were 
above or below the mean high water line. 18B As such, this phase 
represented only a lateral extension of the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Corps. 
Phase II, effective July 1, 1976, incorporated primary tributaries, 
freshwater wetlands contiguous thereto and all lakes not within the 
traditional jurisdiction of the Corps.170 Finally, Phase III, beginning 
July 1, 1977, encompassed the entire area of Section 404 territorial 
jurisdiction. 171 
'85 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (1977), codified in 33 C.F.R. § 323 (1978) . 
... 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
'87 As a preliminary note to review of the regulation, it is important to realize that analysis 
concentrates on the import of the regulation for wetlands, although the Section 404 program 
extends to all "waters of the United States" and discharges of dredged and fill material 
occurring therein. See note 14, supra. 
, .. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2) (1977). 
'" [d. 
110 [d. "Primary tributaries" are the main stems of tributaries directly connected with 
navigable waters. [d. § 209.120(d)(2)(ii)(e). 
"' [d. § 209.120(e)(2). The 1975 regulation extended the coverage of the Section 404 pro-
gram to encompass all areas within EPA's judicially affirmed broad interpretation of 
"navigable waters" as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976). See text at notes 172-78, infra. 
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B. The Delineation of Territorial Jurisdiction 
When the Corps introduced the new regulation, it also an-
nounced: "we recognize that this program, in its effort to protect 
water quality to the full extent of the commerce clause, will extend 
Federal regulation over discharges of dredged or fill material to 
many areas that have never before been subject to Federal permits 
or to this form of water quality protection."172 
Since the regulation set forth the administrative definition of the 
term "navigable waters" for the purpose of Section 404 as "waters 
of the United States including the territorial seas with respect to the 
disposal of fill material and excluding the territorial seas with re-
spect to the disposal of dredged material. . ." 173 the extent of Corps 
jurisdiction paralleled the expanded view of jurisdiction adopted by 
EPA under FWPCA.174 Additionally, the definition listed specific 
waters in eight succeeding sub-paragraphs, in order to assert juris-
diction over areas previously in question. 175 
The definition of "navigable waters" clearly included wetlands by 
specifically mentioning coastal and freshwater wetlands. 176 This dis-
112 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975). 
113 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(i) (1977). The exclusion of dredged material in the territorial 
seas followed from the fact that this activity was already subject to regulation under 33 U .S.C. 
§ 1413 (1976). 
'74 See 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p) (1975). See also text at note 137, supra. 
'" 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(2)(i)(a)-(h) (1977). Ablard and O'Neill discuss in detail the 
significance of these eight sub-paragraphs as they relate to all aspects of the jurisdiction of 
the Corps. Ablard & O'Neill, supra note 38, at 80-91. 
For present purposes in the discussion of the impact of this regulation on wetlands, it is 
interesting to note how the Corps handled the problem which concerned the Dep't of Agricul-
ture, see note 162, supra. The regulation established an arbitrary cut-off point at the "head-
waters" of streams, defined as: 
the point on the stream above which the flow is normally less than five cubic feet per 
second; Provided, however, The volume of flow, point and non-point discharge character-
istics of the watershed, and other factors that may impact on water quality. . . will be 
considered in determining this upstream limit . . . . 
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(ii)(d) (1977). However, at his discretion, the District Engineer of 
the Corps can require permitting for an activity in any area if he determines water quality 
protection so requires, id. § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(i). Therefore, wetland areas fed only by ground-
waters would be regulated, but only when necessary to protect water quality. 
'" Coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and similar areas that are contiguous or adja-
cent to other navigable waters. "Coastal wetlands" includes marshes and shallows and 
means those areas periodically inundated by saline or brackish waters and that are nor-
mally characterized by the prevalence of salt or brackish water vegetation capable of 
growth and reproduction. 
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(b) (1977). 
Freshwater wetlands including marshes, shallows, swamps and, [sic) similar areas that 
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tinction between coastal and freshwater wetlands was perhaps un-
necessary, but the explicit inclusion of mudflats in the coastal cate-
gory made clear the recognition that such saturated areas, while not 
supporting any vegetation, were nonetheless important to hydrol-
ogic cycles. 
The definitions of "coastal wetlands" and "freshwater wetlands" 
demonstrated that the Corps had finally abandoned the procedure 
of determining federal jurisdiction by reference to the high water 
mark when water quality was at issue. 177 Instead, a vegetative index 
was employed in conjunction with periodic inundation and specific 
designations. 178 Therefore, wetlands were firmly ensconced in the 
scope of the Section 404 navigable waters. 
C. Activities Regulated 
The absence of detailed discussion of the terms "dredged and fill 
material" in the legislative history of Section 404179 afforded drafters 
of the regulation significant flexibility in determining which activi-
ties the Corps would subject to permit requirements. This opportun-
ity contributed to the development of definitions that specifically 
excluded some routine activities which were of lesser environmental 
concern or were of such social utility as to justify whatever minor 
pollution they did entail. By creating exemptions, the Corps may 
have allowed some truly harmful activities to escape regulation,IKo 
but the exemptions allowed the Corps to fashion a workable pro-
gram. Thus, while "dredged material" was identified broadly in the 
regulation as "material that is excavated or dredged from navigable 
waters .... ," the definition exempted "material resulting from 
normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities, such as plow-
ing, cultivating, seeding, and harvesting for the production of food, 
fiber and forest products."181 Likewise, fill material included "any 
are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters and that support freshwater vegeta-
tion. "Freshwater wetlands" means those areas that are periodically inundated and that 
are normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires satllrated soil 
conditions for growth and reproduction. 
[d. § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(h). 
177 See id. § 209.120(d)(2). 
"8 See id. §§ 209. 120(d)(2)(i)(b) , (h). 
\711 See text at note 127, supra. 
\80 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 53-54(a), 91 Stat. 
1589-91 (1977» (possibility of discharges of toxic substances during exempted agricultural, 
silvicultural, and industrial activities). See note 285, infra. 
\8\ 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(4) (1977). 
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pollutant used to create fill in the traditional sense of replacing an 
aquatic area with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of a 
waterbody for any purpose," but exempted material resulting from 
the same activities as enumerated in the "dredged material" defini-
tion. 182 Additionally, the definition of "fill material" exempted ma-
terial used in emergency reconstruction or in maintenance of cur-
rently serviceable structures. l83 
Employing definitions to exclude activities from Section 404 cov-
erage accomplished two things: as previously mentioned, it contrib-
uted to the development of a manageable program; second, it as-
suaged apprehension resulting from the Corps' press release. As 
such, exemption was a politically astute maneuver, for burdening 
the powerful interests of forestry, farming and ranching could have 
devastated the entire Section 404 program.184 
D. Permitting Methods 
The regulatory scheme of a permit program generally requires an 
individual application for each separate activity.l85 The Section 404 
regulation followed this basic procedure but also experimented with 
two other permitting techniques. 
In order to obviate the requirement of a specific permit applica-
tion in all cases, the drafters of the regulation devised a general or 
categorical permitting procedure. Activities "substantially similar 
in nature, that cause only minimal adverse environmental impact 
when performed separately, and that will have only a minimal ad-
verse cumulative effect on the environment. . . "188 could qualify for 
general permits. Once issued, a general permit would authorize 
clearly described categories of work; individual activities within 
such categories needed no further authorization. Since Section 404 
required that permits be issued only for specified disposal sites, 187 
the general permit procedure required either that specific water 
'82 [d. § 209.120(d)(6). 
'83 [d. 
'14 See generally House 404 Hearings, 1975, supra note 156. Many congressmen were espe· 
cially concerned that the Section 404 program would interfere with the routine activities of 
farmers, ranchers, and foresters. The exemptive definitions made it possible for the Corps to 
accommodate these concerns by excluding activities from permit requirements while main· 
taining broad territorial jurisdiction. 
, •• See discussion of RAPP, text at notes 84·90, supra. 
'II 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i)(2)(ix)(a) (1977). 
'.7 See text of Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976), at note 6, supra. 
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bodies be designated by the permit or that dischargers report to the 
local Corps' authority forty-five days prior to the commencement of 
work involving discharges. ISS Under this procedure beach erosion 
control projects along an area of coastline or construction of small 
recreational piers on a particular body of water could be permitted 
generally, subject to specific conditions and qualifications. 
The second procedure designed to alleviate the anticipated ad-
ministrative burden of the Section 404 program was permitting 
through the regulation itself; the regulation itself was functionally 
a permit for certain specifically defined activities. ISU Subject to 
listed environmental criteria, the construction of bulkheads less 
than 500 feet long, using less than one cubic yard of fill per running 
foot, could be undertaken in waters not also covered by Section 10 
of the Rivers and Harbors Act without any permit application. luu 
The regulation also "automatically" permitted a very small class of 
projects underway when the regulation was promulgated. 
E. The Success of the 1975 Regulations 
The Corps of Engineers responded to the challenges posed by the 
court's order in NRDC v. Callaway by developing a permit program 
that could accomodate the enormity of the expanded territorial 
jurisdiction and by implementing the program in phases. Further-
more, the Corps' regulation, although fashioned to resolve practical 
problems, established clear territorial jurisdiction over the nation's 
wetlands. Read in conjunction with guidelines promulgated by EPA 
pursuant to Section 404(b) on September 5, 1975191 the Section 404 
regulation seemed to be a firm step forward in halting the devastat-
ing destruction of wetlands. The stated policy considerations in re-
viewing permit applications for projects militated strongly against 
wetlands development. In net effect the program proceded with a 
rebuttable presumption against construction in wetlands if alterna-
tives existed. 192 
188 40 Fed. Reg. 41,296 (1975). 
1S. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2)(iv) (1977). 
110 Id. 
111 40 Fed. Reg. 41,292-98 (1975), codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-2:30.8 (1977) (as amended). 
"' The Corps regulations stated that H[u]nless the public interest requires otherwise, no 
permit shall be granted for work in wetlands .... " 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(2)(iv) (1977). The 
EPA regulations stated that: 
The following objectives shall be considered in making [a determination as to site 
selection] : 
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The Corps encouraged public comment on the in term final regu-
lation during Phase I. It conducted hearings throughout the United 
States to solicit the public's views about the program. This process 
was in part an educational effort to assuage fears aroused by the 
1975 press release. 193 
During the comment period public response was evenly divided 
between proponents of expanded jurisdiction and opponents lU4 who 
considered the 404 program another instance of federal government 
intrusion on local concerns. Proponents saw the expansion as a via-
ble mechanism for retarding the continued filling and elimination 
of wetlands, as well as a necessary component in the general effort 
to control water pollution caused by hydrologic modification. Offi-
cials of the Department of the Interior and EPA joined in support 
of expansion of Corps jurisdiction. 195 
The most vocal and best organized opponents were representa-
tives of agricultural, forestry and construction interests who were 
uncertain whether the 1975 regulation's exceptions were broad 
enough to exempt their activities.198 They were greatly disturbed by 
the threat that many heretofore routine, unregulated activities 
would become mired in an irksome, expensive and time-consuming 
permitting process. 
These opponents, perhaps because of past experience with admin-
istrative bureaucracy, took their grievances to Congress and de-
manded statutory revision of Section 404. While Congress consid-
(1) Avoid discharge activities that significantly disrupt the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the aquatic ecosystem . . . 
(2) Avoid discharge activities that significantly disrupt the food chain . . . 
(3) ... 
(4) Avoid discharge activities that will destroy wetland areas having significant func-
tions in maintenance of water quality . . . . 
40 C.F.R. §§ 230.5(a)(I)-(4) (1977). See also Comment, Corps Confirms Policy Against 
"Unnecessary" Development in Wetlands, 6 ENVT'L L. REp. 10,117 (1976) . 
.,3 See, e.g., Note, Wetlands Protection Under the Corps of Engineers New Dredge and Fill 
Jurisdiction, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 223, 235 n.77 (1976) . 
... See 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1963 (1976). 50% favorable, 43% unfavorable, 7% no clear 
choice.Id . 
.,. See 122 CONGo REc. H5275 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Oberstar quoting 
statements of Nathaniel P. Reed, Ass't Sec'y of the Interior, in Duluth News Tribune, May 
21, 1976). See also 6 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 2172 (1976). 
, .. See, e.g., 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 643 (1975) (comment of Robert W. Long, Ass't Sec'y of 
Agriculture); Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 227 (Statement of William H. McCredie, 
National Forest Products Association); at 551 (Statement of Bruce Hawley, Ass't Dir., Na-
tional Affairs, National Farm Bureau). See also Boxer, Every Pond and Puddle - or, How 
Far Can the Army Corps Stretch the Intent of Congress, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 467 (1976). 
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ered revisions in 1976, a group of legislators persuaded President 
Ford to delay implementation of Phase II, scheduled for July 1, 
1976.117 However, despite the extended period for review, the mora-
torium on Phase II implementation expired on September 1,198 and 
Congress thereafter adjourned on September 30, 1976 without tak-
ing any further action with respect to Section 404. 
While Congress continued to consider further action in 1977, the 
Corps responded to public concern and confusion by revising the 
1975 regulation before publishing it in final form. Following imple-
mentation of Phase ill on July 1, 1977 this revised regulation ap-
peared on July 19, 1977.1" Currently in effect, it made refinements 
in the 404 program which reflected the practical problems encoun-
tered during Phases I and II and anticipated under Phase III. 
VIT. THE 1977 REGULATION 
The 1977 regulation is important not only because it is now in 
effect but also because both the expansion and the rejection of cer-
tain appraoches taken by the 1975 regulation constituted a further 
evolution of the federal wetlands regulatory effort. These revisions 
contributed substantially to the statutory amendment undertaken 
by Congress later in 1977. The most significant revisions in the 1977 
regulation were a new approach to interpreting navigable waters, a 
redefinition of wetlands; and an expansion of the permitting by 
regulation approach- introduced by the 1975 regulation. 
A comprehensive introduction preceded the new regulation,201 
providing a historical perspective and summarizing the purpose of 
the final regulation as being "to make the policies and procedures 
[of the Corps] more understandable to a person desiring to perform 
work in the waters of the United States. "202 The 1975 regulation had 
117 7 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 435 (1977). This action of delay outraged the National Wildlife 
Federation, an original party plaintiff in N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 
1975). A representative of the organization characterized the action as "clear illegality" since 
"first, the regulations were published pursuant to direct court order ... [and] second, any 
alteration in implementation dates. . . may lawfully be made only through amendatory rule 
making action or by Act of Congress." Statement of Louis D. Clapper, Sen. 404 Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 412. 
III The moratorium imposed by President Ford lasted only 60 days. See 7 ENVIR. REp. 
(BNA) 435-36 (1977). 
III 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122-64 (1977), codified in 33 C.F.R. Part 323 (1978). 
200 See text at note 189, supra. 
211 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122-33 (1977). 
202 [d. at 37,122. 
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combined the Section 404 provisions with other Corps permitting 
programs under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899; these different 
programs were all codified in one part of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 203 This intermingling of other programs based on traditional 
navigable waters with the broader based Section 404 program204 had 
generated confusion. Therefore, the 1977 revision separated the dif-
ferent permit programs, general regulatory policies and permit pro-
cessing procedures into separate sections.205 This simple device al-
lowed easy reference to each program; however, some activities were 
still subject to more than one program. 20ft 
A. Territorial Jurisdiction: Adoption of the Term "Waters of the 
United States" and A New Definition of Wetlands 
The 1977 revisions of the Section 404 program adopted a new 
approach to the definition and interpretation of the term "navigable 
waters."207 This confusing and troublesome term, afflicted with the 
doctrinal gravity resulting from decades of judicial construction of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, was rejected in favor of the term 
"waters of the United States." By employing the definitional term 
of Section 502(7) of FWPCA the regulation clarified the distinction 
between the scope of Section 404 and other Corps regulatory pro-
grams based on the term "navigable waters" in its classical sense. 
The delineation of "waters of the United States" categorized waters 
in separate groupings, beginning with those longest recognized as 
being subject to federal control and concluding with those waters 
most recently subject to federal jurisdiction under FWPCA.20H The 
final sub-paragraph of this categorization, and a footnote thereto, 
indicated that the new definition reflected an approach to the regu-
lation of discharges of dredged and fill material from the perspective 
of congressional authority to regulate all water pollution which in 
any way affected interstate commerce.209 
203 33 C.F.R. Part 209 (1977). 
20. The Section 404 program was based on the more expansive definition of "navigable 
waters" as "waters of the United States" in Section 502(7) of FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) 
(1976). 
205 The 1977 regulation rescinded 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120, 209.125, 209.131, 209.133, 209.150, 
209.260, and replaced them with a new series, 33 C.F.R. Parts 320·29. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,125 
(1977). 
208 An activity involving discharge of dredged and fill material in traditional navigable 
waters would fall within Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Section 404 of FWPCA. 
2.7 See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(a)(I)·(5) (1978). 
208 [d. 
2 •• "All other waters ... such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie 
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The 1977 regulation also took a new approach to incorporating 
wetlands within the territorial expanse of Section 404.210 The sum-
mary which introduced the 1977 revisions referred to comments 
received from the public expressing dissatisfaction with the dichot-
omy between "coastal" and "fresh-water" wetlands and the vague-
ness of terms such as "periodically inundated," "normally" and 
"adjacent."211 Responding to these complaints, the 1977 regulation 
abandoned the distinction between "coastal" and "fresh-water" 
wetlands by adding the words "including adjacent wetlands" to 
each category of waters listed as "waters of the United States. "212 
The terms "wetlands" and "adjacent" were then defined sepa-
rately: 
The term "wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or saturated 
by surface or grQundwater at a frequency and duration to support, and 
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands gener-
ally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas .... 213 The term 
"adjacent" means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands sep-
arated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or 
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are "adjacent 
wetlands. "214 
This new method of defining territorial jurisdiction by dropping 
the term "~avigable waters" and redefining wetlands did not dimin-
ish the scope of the 404 program, but instead clarified the wide 
expanse of hydrologic cycles which the program covered.215 
potholes, and other waters. . . ,the degradation or destruction of which could affect inter-
state commerce." [d. § 323.2(a)(5). See also id. at n.2. 
210 [d. §§ 323.2(a)-(d). 
ZII 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977). 
212 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(a)(1)-(4) (1978). 
213 [d. § 323.2(c). This definition was the product of a joint effort by the Corps of Engineers, 
EPA and the Departments of Interior and Agriculture. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977). 
214 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1978). 
ZII The summary which introduced the regulation commented: 
Prior to the enactment of the FWPCA, the mean high tide line (mean higher tide line on 
the West Coast) was used to delineate the shoreward extent of jurisdiction over the 
regulation of most activities- in tidal waters under the 1899 Act as well as for mapping, 
delineation of property boundaries, and other related purposes. In fresh water lakes, rivers 
and streams that are navigable waters of the United States, the landwllrd limit of jurisdic-
tion has been traditionally established at the ordinary high water mark. 
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on these artificial 
lines, however, but must focus on all waters that together form the entire aquatic system. 
Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic system, 
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B. New Terminology of Exemption and Expansion of Permitting 
by Regulation: Nationwide Permits 
The 1975 regulation had experimented with different techniques 
designed to exclude many activities from plenary review under Sec-
tion 404.218 The 1977 regulation continued the experiment of the 
general or categorical permit and, importantly, vastly expanded the 
concept of permitting activities through the regulation itself.217 
However, the 1975 regulation's device of exempting specific activi-
ties by simply excluding the discharges they entailed from the defi-
nitions of "dredged material" and "fill material" had been jeopard-
ized by the holding of a district court in a suit by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council against EPA. 
In NRDC v. Train,218 environmentalists brought suit against the 
Administrator of EPA alleging that the exemption of certain classes 
of point source discharges from the prohibitions of Section 301 of 
FWPCA on the basis of the type of industry involved in the dis-
charging activity (such as agriculture and silviculture) violated the 
Act's provisions.219 The court held that the Act did not allow such 
discretionary exemption, absent specific authorization by Con-
gress. 220 
Thus, in order to maintain a workable program, the 1977 regula-
tion had to retain some means of exempting certain activities from 
review, while at the same time accommodating the holding in 
NRDC v. Train. The Corps solved this problem by removing 
industry-defined exemptions from the definitions of "dredged mate-
rial" and "fill material." Instead, the Corps amended the defini-
tions of "discharge of dredged material" and "discharge of fill mate-
rial" to include a closing proviso that these terms did not include 
"plowing, cultivating, seeding and harvesting for the production of 
regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide 
line, will affect water quality of the other waters within that aquatic system. 
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section 404 must 
include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to 
other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of the aquatic system. 
42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977). 
218 See text at notes 180-90, supra. 
217 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.4 - 323.4-4 (1978). 
%l8 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975) aff'd sub nom. N.R.D.C. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) . 
... [d. at 1395. 
220 [d. at 1402. 
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food, fiber, and forest products."221 
This sleight of hand by the drafters of the 1977 regulation brought 
the regulation within the confines of the court's opinion in NRDC 
v. Train,222 but did not adequately preserve the broad exemptions 
that guaranteed non-interference with the routine activities of farm-
ers and others. To assure non-interference and to eliminate other 
projects from individual permit review, the Corps expanded the 
experiment of permitting by regulation. 223 This technique of using 
the regulation to serve functionally as a permit was accomplished 
by the creation of a nationwide permit. 224 
The nationwide permit had two separate and distinct compo-
nents, each of which was intended to respond to a different con-
cern.225 First, it applied to specific types of discharges. 226 The parti-
cular categories of discharges covered by the permit might take 
place anywhere, subject only to the restraints of local law and the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. Thus, even though a specific type 
of discharge of dredged or fill material might be excluded from 
individual review by the Corps under Section 404 since the 1977 
regulation functionally operated as a permit for it, if such a dis-
charge occurred in navigable waters as traditionally defined, a Sec-
tion 10 permit might be required. 227 The second component of the 
nationwide permit applied to discharges of dredged or fill material 
into certain waters.228 The list of waters where discharges might 
occur included several wetlands areas. 228 However, the sections of 
'21 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(1),(n) (1978). 
'22 Congress incorporated the broad exemptions for "normal farming, silviculture, and 
ranching activities" into the 1977 Amendments of Section 404; thus, this method of exemp-
tion by simply changing language was never challenged. See text at note 282, infra. 
'23 See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4 (1978). 
'" "The term 'nationwide permit' means a Department of the Army authorization that has 
been issued by this regulation. . . to permit certain discharges of dredged and fill material 
into waters of the United States throughout the Nation." [d. at § :323.2(q). 
'20 See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,130 (1977). 
'" 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-3 (1978). 
'27 [d. 
"8 [d. at § 323.4-2 . 
... The following waters and wetlands were listed: 
(1) Non-tidal rivers, streams and their impoundments including adjacent wetlands 
that are located above the headwaters; 
(2) Natural lakes, including their adjacent wetlands, that are less than 10 acres in 
surface area and that are fed or drained by a river or stream above the headwaters. In the 
absence of adjacent wetlands, the surface area of a lake shall be determined at the ordi-
nary high water mark; 
(3) Natural lakes, including their adjacent wetlands, that are less than 10 acres in 
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the 1977 regulation which established the two components of the 
nationwide permit listed specific conditions to be met in order for 
the discharge of dredged or fill material to qualify: 
1. The discharge must not destroy an endangered species or its 
habitat; 
2. Discharges must be free of toxic pollutants except in trace 
quantities; 
3. All discharges must be properly maintained to prevent ero-
sion and water quality diminution; and 
4. Discharges must not occur in a component of the National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers System or a State equivalent thereof. 230 
Beyond these specific constraints, the 1977 regulation provided 
certain management practices to be followed "to the maximum ex-
tent practicable."231 These practices include: 
1. Seeking alternative approaches in order to avoid discharges; 
2. Avoidance of spawning areas; 
3. Precautions so as to avoid interference with the movement of 
an indigenous aquatic species, unless the purpose of the fill is to 
impound water; 
4. Minimization of adverse impact on water quality resulting 
from restriction of water flow; 
5. Avoidance of all discharges in wetlands; 
6. The utilization of mats when performing work with heavy 
equipment in wetlands; 
7. Avoidance of breeding and nesting areas of waterfowl; and 
8. Removal of all temporary fills. 232 
Thus, while across-the-board compliance with these conditions 
and practices would best protect wetlands,233 the nationwide permit 
[d. 
surface area and that are isolated and not a part of a surface river or stream. In the absence 
of adjacent wetlands. the surface area of a lake shall be determined at the ordinary high 
water mark; and 
(4) Other non-tidal waters of the United States other than isolated lakes larger than 
10 acres (see (3) above) that are not part of a surface tributary system to interstate waters 
or navigable waters of the United States .... 
230 [d. §§ 323.4-2 (conditions upon discharges into certain waters of the United States). 
323.4-3 (conditions upon specific categories of discharges). 
231 [d. at § 323.4(b). 
232 [d. 
233 The summary introducing the 1977 revisions explained: 
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scheme clearly indicated a shift in focus from regulating all projects 
to controlling major projects. Although specific restraints such as 
discretionary authority to require individual or general permits were 
retained,234 the nationwide permit amounted to a wide-scale retreat 
from individual review of all potentially harmful activities clearly 
within the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under Section 404. 235 This 
retreat, however, was perhaps a practical necessity. 
The manpower and budgetary constraints placed upon the Corps 
greatly inhibited the effective processing and review of individual 
permit applications. District offices of the Corps were understaffed, 
precluding effective investigation and enforcement of violations. 2:16 
Furthermore, the general public did not provide much assistance to 
enforcement efforts; while certain environmental groups may have 
been familiar with the program and willing to report illegal activi-
ties, the average citizen certainly was not. 
The preservation of a respected, wide-scale program depended 
upon the ability of the Corps to administer and enforce it effec-
tively. By excluding from plenary review activities occurring in wa-
ters more remotely connected with interstate commerce, the Corps 
avoided extensive litigation concerning their territorial jurisdic-
tion.237 The inclusion in the nationwide permit of specific categories 
We are responding to the concern of uncertainty over the need to obtain a permit in ... 
[certain] waters by issuing today a nationwide permit for discharges into most of these 
waters. We believe that if the common sense conditions, guidelines and management 
practices ... are followed, the concern for water quality, as it affects the production, 
movement, and for use for interstate commerce, ordinarily will be satisfied with respect 
to these discharges. 
42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977). 
, .. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-4 (1978). 
,35 The incorporation of specific types of discharges and discharges into certain waters into 
the nationwide permit reflected the reality that an absolute ban on all discharging of dredged 
and fill material in wetland areas of the United States was impossible to administer and 
enforce. The issue of whether the 1977 regulation was too broad in its exclusion of certain 
activities from plenary review is difficult to resolve, but the question has not been litigated, 
largely due to the subsequent "re-statement" of congressional intent embodied in the 1977 
amendments to Section 404 discussed in the text at notes 270-98, infra. As a potential defense 
against such challenges, the 1977 regulaton added a proviso to the expansive scope of the 
nationwide permits by retaining discretionary authority in District Engineers to require indi-
vidual or general permits "if the District Engineer determines that the concerns of the aquatic 
environment, as expressed in the [EPA] guidelines (see 40 C.F.R. part 230) indicate the need 
for such action because of individual and/or cumulative adverse impacts to the affected 
waters." 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-4 (1978) . 
.. 6 C{. Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 56 (Statement of Victor V. Veysey, Ass't Sec'y 
of the Army, Civil Works (suggestions for conservation of personnel and resources». 
237 In this way the Corps avoided repeating the difficulties experienced under the 1899 Act, 
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of discharges often undertaken by utility companies, maintenance 
and construction crews of local and state governments and landown-
ers protecting their property from erosion spared the Corps from 
constantly interfering with these necessary activities.238 If the ex-
emptions from plenary review went too far, the absence of a firm 
statutory mandate from Congress and the lack of sufficient funding 
were more to blame than inertia or a desultory effort on the part of 
the Corps.23U 
Review of the 1977 regulation must proceed in the context of the 
political turmoil which attended its appearance. Powerful interests 
were lending their well-organized support to proposed legislation 
that would have vitiated the reach of Corps jurisdiction under the 
Section 404 program.240 The legislative maelstrom which began in 
1976 and continued through 1977 was fraught with misinformation, 
indignation and allegations of usurpation of congressional legisla-
tive power by the courts and the Corps.241 This climate threatened 
to destroy a very necessary and important program protecting the 
< nation's wetlands and water quality. The new regulation projected 
the image of an orderly, manageable and reasonable approach to 
achieving the goals of FWPCA. Thus, the moderate tack taken by 
the 1977 regulation may have saved the Section 404 program. 
VIII. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM 
The final component of the legal process that produced the re-
vised Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977 was the legislative 
proceedings that occurred in 1976 and 1977.242 The events attending 
the development of Section 404 had attracted the attention of Con-
gress at an early stage, and that attention did not wane through 
i.e., the constant litigating of the boundaries of jurisdiction. Cf. United States v. Holland, 
373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (EPA brought action). In fact, the Doctrine of Navigable 
Waters under the 1899 Act had developed expansively,largely in connection with the affirma-
tive defense that the prosecuted activity was not within the ambit of Corps jurisdiction. See 
generally Hoyer, supra note 67 . 
• 38 See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-3 (1978). 
230 See text at note 250, infra . 
... See, e.g., Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3 at 131·32, 159·323,384·89. See also, To Amend 
and Extend Authorizations for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings before the 
Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382·87, 398·403 (1977). 
24' See, e.g., 122 CONGo REc. H5267·68 (Daily ed. June 3,1976) (Remarks of Rep. Wright) . 
... The events of the 1976 legislative session are discussed in detail in Caplin, Is Congress 
Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 445 (1977). 
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subsequent developments. 243 The proposed statutory modificatons 
of Section 404 fell into two broad categories, those seeking to reduce 
the scope of the Corps' territorial jurisdiction and provide for state 
participation244 and those aimed at maintaining the broad territorial 
reach of the section, while amending and integrating it within the 
overall scheme of the Act. 245 The House of Representatives over-
whelmingly favored reducing jurisdiction, and many Senators were 
willing to acquiesce in their proposals. The one-year delay caused 
by a Conference Committee deadlock at the end of the 1976 legisla-
tive session provided valuable time for those legislators dedicated 
to maintaining the scope of the program to marshall their forces and 
prevail in 1977. Interestingly, the debate over Section 404 reflected 
a somewhat novel occurrence; environmental lobbying groups sud-
denly were fighting to preserve the status quo, rather than urging 
the implementation of new protective legislation. 
A. 1976: The Framing of Issues 
1. The Breaux Amendment 
In the 1976 legislative session, the House Public Works Commit-
tee was considering H.R. 9650, a bill to provide financial authoriza-
tons under FWPCA.248 In the spring of that year, Representative 
Breaux of Louisiana, a state with extensive wetland acreage, offered 
an amendment to Section 404, which the committee adopted. The 
proposed amendment became Section 17 of H.R. 9650. 247 
243 See House and Senate Hearings, supra note 156. 
'44 The Corps had developed procedures to coordinate processing applications with state 
and local agencies. See generally 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(0 (1977) (superceded by 33 C.F.R. 
§ 320.4(j) (1978)). While the development of joint processing encouraged public acceptance 
of the expanded 404 program, avoided duplicative efforts and diminished discredit of the 
federal regulatory effort caused by expensive and unnecessary delay in administrative pro-
cessing, Section 404 itself provided no mechanism whereby states might take over the pro-
gram, and thus did not comport with the stated goals of FWPCA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
(1976). As Victor V. Veysey, Ass't Secretary of the Army, stated to the Senate Committee on 
Public Works: 
I believe there [is] a real need to allow delegation of the program to states, subject, of 
course, to adequate standards that would allow for National Water Quality Management. 
Up to this point, however, there has been only a limited opportunity for discourse with 
the states because the Act does not provide a legal basis for delegation of Section 404. 
Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 . 
... That is, by providing a mechanism whereby states could take over the program subject 
to on-going federal supervision . 
... H.R. 9650, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
'17 [d. § 17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 
1107, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-63 (1976). 
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The concern of Representative Breaux focused upon the definition 
of navigable waters. His amendment would have added two subsec-
tions to Section 404: 
(d) the term "navigable waters" as used in this section shall mean all 
waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natu-
ral condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport 
interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water 
mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide shoreward to their mean high water mark (mean higher high water 
mark on the west coast); 
(e) the discharge of dredged or fill material in waters other than navig-
able waters is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under 
this Act, or section 9, section 10, or section 13 of the Act of March 3, 
1899.248 
This proposal represented the most extreme position for with-
drawal of Corps jurisdiction and substantively would have had 
greater limiting effect than the outright repeal of Section 404. The 
definition in subsection (d) would have removed the test of historic 
navigability and the concept of "indelible navigability"249 from the 
ambit of navigable waters ~s traditionally defined. Subsections (d) 
and (e) together would have eradicated the judicially sanctioned 
reach of regulatory efforts under Sections 10 and 13 of the River and 
Harbors Act, thus removing many wetlands from their protection as 
well. 
The Committee Report of the Breaux Amendment clearly stated 
the intent to remove from regulation by the Corps any waterway not 
susceptible to use in commercial navigation presently or with rea-
sonable improvements. The Committee commented: "without such 
an amendment we find ourselves with a program that promises more 
while delivering less and discourages the States from exercising 
their proper role in the management of water and wetland areas 
which traditionally have been within their responsibility."25o The 
Committee concluded that the Section 404 program as set forth in 
the 1975 regulation would prove impossible to administer effec-
tively, and "the required additional personnel [could] not be real-
Z4I [d. The parenthetical reference to the mean higher high water mark on the west coast 
reflects the fact that the two daily tides of the Pacific Ocean are disparate; thus the higher 
of the two is the boundary. 
... See text at notes 59-50, supra. 
ZIG H.R. REp. No. 1107, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). 
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istically expected to be approved by either the Administration or by 
the Congress. "251 
Opposition preceded the Breaux Amendment to the floor of the 
House. During debate, Representative Cleveland of New Hampshire 
proposed a moderate position which had Administration backing. 
The Cleveland Amendments to Section 404 would have codified the 
general permits and exemptions of the 1975 Section 404 regula-
tion;252 however, the Amendment was defeated by the House on 
June 3, 1976 in favor of another amendment proposed by Represent-
ative Wright of Texas.253 
2. The Wright Amendment 
The 1976 Wright Amendment was offered again in 1977, and parts 
of it survived and are found in the present version of Section 404. 
This proposal added "and adjacent wetlands" to the Breaux 
Amendment's definition of navigable waters, then added subsection 
(f) which authorized the Secretary of the Army to enter into agree-
ments with states regarding the regulation of other wetland areas 
not adjacent to navigable waters.254 Therefore, regulation of such 
wetlands could be requested by a state, but the program would be 
run by the Corps itself.255 
Subsections (g) and (h) incorporated the general permit proce-
dures and subject matter exemptions, respectively, of the 1975 regu-
lation.258 Subsection (i) exempted federal or federally-assisted pro-
jects from permit requirements, if the impacts of any dredging and 
filling involved had been included in an environmental impact 
statement submitted to Congress in connection with the authoriza-
25' [d. at 22. 
202 See 122 CONGo REc. H5266 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Cleveland) . 
... See id. at H5267 (remarks of Rep. Wright). 
'04 See id. 
25. The Wright Amendment essentially would have limited the Corps jurisdiction under 
Section 404 to those waters covered by Phase I of the 1975 regulation, see text at note 169, 
supra, incorporating only those wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters. The com-
promise embodied in the Wright Amendment was the provision authorizing the Corps to 
assume jurisdiction over other wetland areas at the request of the Governor of a state. The 
shortcomings of such a compromise are obvious, for in the event of no such request, hydrologi-
cally important wetland areas not adjacent to traditional navigable waters, as well as non-
navigable waters, would remain unprotected from the impacts of disposal of dredged or fill 
material. The resultant water quality diminution was not considered in this politically expe-
ditious compromise. 
, .. See 122 CONGo REc. H5267 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Wright). 
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tion of such projects.267 
Finally, the Wright Amendment expressed a desire to return tra-
ditional regulatory responsibilities back to the states; however, 
rather than casting wetlands protection into an uncertain void, 
subsection (j) contemplated the creation of a mechanism similar to 
that under Section 402 of FWPCA,258 whereby the Section 404 pro-
gram could be delegated to the states. Such delegation was possible 
if the Secretary of the Army determined: "(A) that the state has the 
authority, responsibility and capability to carry out such func-
tions;" and "(B) that such delegation is in the public interest." 
The Wright Amendment passed in the House on June 3, 1976 by 
a vote of 234 to 121.26' 
3. Senate Response: The Baker-Randolph Amendment 
The Senate Public Works Committee held oversight hearings on 
July 27 and 28, 1976 and heard testimony from Assistant Secretary 
of the Army Victor V. Veysey urging continued broad territorial 
jurisdiction and announcing administration support.280 Yet, despite 
remonstrations from Senator Muskie,281 Senators Baker and Ran-
dolph drafted an amendment to S. 2710282 utilizing a different ap-
proach than the Wright Amendment. This amendment would have: 
1. reduced Corps territorial jurisdiction for purposes of Section 
404 to traditional limits under the Rivers and Harbors Act; 
2. required that permits be obtained from EPA for other point 
source discharges in other waters of United States; 
3. not defined wetlands as areas separate from waters of the 
United States; 
4. provided for specific exemptions and general permitting of 
217 See id. The original Committee Report on the Breaux Amendment had expressed dis-
pleasure at the Corps' regulation of programs previously authorized by Congress: 
Even specific statutory enactments of Congress are being challenged as being subject to 
veto through the present section 404 program. For example, a Bureau of Reclamation or 
watershed project authorized by Congress is alleged by some to require a section 404 
permit before it can be constructed. Executive agencies have not been granted such powers 
to overturn specific congressional enactments. 
H.R. REP. No. 1107, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 23 (1976). 
2111 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976). 
2If 122 CONGo REc. H5280 (daily ed. June 3, 1976). 
210 Sen. 404 Hearings, supra note 3, at 51-59. 
z" [d. at 2. 
HZ Following passage in the House of Representatives H.R. 9560 was redesignated S. 2710, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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certain activities as did the 1975 regulation; 
5. allowed for the delegation of permit programs to the states 
under the criteria employed in Section 402 of the FWPCA; and 
6. provided for general permitting of activities having a de mini-
mus impact on water quality.283 
The Public Works Committee approved the amendment 7 to 6, and 
the bill went to the Senate floor on September 1, 1976. 
On the floor of the Senate, Senator Tower proposed the Wright 
Amendment, just as Senator Bentsen had in committee.284 The first 
vote carried 39 to 38,285 but then Senator Baker arrived from a meet-
ing with the President, won two procedural votes,288 and upon recon-
sideration the Wright Amendment failed 39 to 40. 287 The Senate and 
House proposals288 were sent to Joint Conference Committee but the 
Conferees could not reach a compromise. Section 404 had survived 
the 1976 legislative Session. 
C. 1977: Compromise 
The 1977 legislative session began with the immediate resurrec-
tion of the Section 404 dispute. The House approved the Wright 
Amendment in slightly modified form, while the Senate again 
passed the Baker-Randolph Amendment,. This time the Conference 
Committee was able to contour a compromise289 and the resulting 
legislation, the Clean Water Act of 1977, was enacted on December 
27, 1977. 
IX. THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977: THE NEW SECTION 404 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977270 preserves intact the 
broad territorial jurisdiction of the Corps;271 it does not alter the 
administrative interpretation of "waters of the United States" 
283 The text of the Baker-Randolph Amendment is found at 122 CONGo REC. S15,166-68 
(daily ed. Sept. 1, 1976). 
'84 Id. at S15,177. 
'" Id. at S15,183. 
'88 Id. at S15,184. 
'17 Id. at S15,185. 
". The Baker-Randolph Amendment and the Wright Amendment, respectively. 
, .. H.R. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-44 (1977). 
270 Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 67(a), (b), 91 Stat. 1600, (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1344(a)-(t). 
211 The Clean Water Act of 1977 did not amend the definition of "navigable waters" as 
"waters of the United States" in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976). 
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which emerged in the 1977 regulation. 272 However, the addition of 
sixteen new subsections effected three basic results. First, the new 
Section 404 incorporates and expands the exemptive definitions of 
the original 1975 regulation and 1977 revisions and provides a statu-
tory underpinning for them.273 Second, by cross-reference to an 
amendment of Section 208 of FWPCA,274 Section 404 exempts from 
permitting dredge and fill activities already regulated under state 
Best Management Practices.275 Finally, the amended statute pro-
vides a mechanism whereby states may take over the Section 404 
program in waters and wetlands, 
other than those which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in 
their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to 
transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary 
high water mark including all waters which are subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide shoreward to their. . . mean high water mark or mean 
higher high water mark on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent 
thereto. 278 
The Administrator of EPA is to supervise the process by which 
states will assume responsibility under their own laws; notice and 
consultation requirements ensure on-going federal oversight of 
state-run programs.277 Thus, Section 404 is more closely coordinated 
with the stated policy of the original FWPCA of 1972 to recognize 
the primary responsibility of the states to protect water quality. 27M 
272 See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1978). 
273 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600-01 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1344(e), (f). 
'" 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1976). 
27. The amendment to Section 208 of FWPCA was Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 34(a), 91 Stat. 
1577-78 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(4)(A), (B), (C), (D». The term "Best 
Management Practices" is an engineering term of art adopted by EPA, and defined in agency 
regulations as follows: 
The term "Best Management Practices" (BMP) means a practice, or combination of 
practices, that is determined by a State (or designated areawide planning agency) after 
problem assessment, examination of alternative practices, and appropriate public partici-
pation to be the most effective, practicable (including technological, economic and insti-
tutional considerations) means of preventing or reducing the amount of pollution gener-
ated by non point sources to a level compatible with water quality goals. 
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(q) (1977). 
270 See Pub. L. No. 95-217 § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600, 1601 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(g». 
277 See id., 91 Stat. 1600-06 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g)-(t». 
'" See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976). 
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A. Codification and Expansion of the Regulations 
Subsections (e) and (f) of the amended Section 404 codify the 
exemptive approaches of the 1975 and 1977 regulations27u through 
general and nationwide permits and exclusion of certain activities. 2Mo 
To accommodate the holding in NRDC v. Train,281 subsection (f) 
specifically exempts the "normal activities" of farming, silviculture 
and ranching activities.282 Furthermore, explicitly exeinpted are 
dredge and fill activities undertaken for the purposes of: 
1. construction of temporary sedimentation basins on construc-
tion sites; 
2. construction or maintenance of farm and forest roads, or tem-
porary roads for moving mine equipment; 
3. construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irriga-
tion ditches; and 
4. the maintenance of drainage ditches. 283 
Any activities exempted from Section 404 coverage, including dis-
charges resulting from any activity already subject to an EPA-
approved state program under Section 208,284 may still be prohibited 
by effluent standards or prohibitions under Section 307 of the Act. 2M• 
Subsection (f)(2) tempers the wide scope of these exemptions: 
any discharge of dredged or fill material. . . incidental to any activity 
having as its purpose bringing an area ... into a use to which it was 
not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters 
may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be re-
quired to have a permit under this section. 286 
270 See text at notes 179-90 (1975 Regulation), 216-37 (1977 Regulation), supra. 
2,. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600-01 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1344(e), (f)). 
28\ 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), afl'd sub nom. N.R.D.C. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). 
282 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600-01 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(f)(1)(A)). 
283 [d. § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1600-01 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(f)(1)(B), (C), 
(D), (E)). 
2.' 33 U.S.C. § 1288, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 34(a), 91 Stat. 1577-78 (1977). 
2 •• 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 53-54(a), 91 Stat. 1589-91 
(1977)). This requirement recognizes that dredged spoil and fill often contain toxic pollutants 
from industrial and agricultural use. However, a literal reading of the statute would require 
testing of all material to be discharged to determine its chemical content. Obviously, this 
procedure would defeat the purpose of the sub-section by eliminating the administrative 
convenience of avoiding plenary review and streamlining procedures. 
2M' Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1601 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(f) (2)). 
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This proviso serves as a safeguard to subvert land use alteration 
undertaken in the guise of an exempted activity. Thus, while 
"normal farming" activity may include converting wetlands to ara-
ble land, subsection (f)(2) requires permitting of such activities. 2X7 
B. State Assumption of Dredge and Fill Supervision 
The Administrator of EPA has substantial responsibility in over-
seeing the process of transferring dredge and fill supervision to a 
state desirous of taking over such regulation in waters not specifi-
cally reserved for Corps jurisdiction.288 The detailed statutory 
scheme contains complicated notice and response deadlines and 
requires consultation between the Administrator of EPA, the Secre-
tary of the Army and the Director of the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service regarding the ability and authority of a state to 
manage a responsible program.289 While the Corps is to maintain 
jurisdiction over waters used or of potential use in navigation, 2911 
.87 See 123 CONGo REC. S19,653 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
This is a very important provision in light of the observations of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality: 
The filling or draining of wetlands does not necessarily waste the land, which may be 
turned into other valuable but competing uses. In fact, 24 percent of all agricultural soils 
on non-federal lands in the United States were originally wetlands. One half of wet soils 
(outside non-federal lands) falls in the prime farmland class. 
CEQ REPORT, 1978, supra note 24, at 318. If wetlands are to be preserved to provide their 
vital natural functions, conversion to agricultural use by incremental hydrologic modification 
must be retarded. Therefore, subsection (0(2) prohibits this practice, notwithstanding the 
CEQ Report's suggestion that such land use conversion is a long-standing, agriculturally 
productive practice. 
288 See Pub. L. No.95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1601-05 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1344(g) -(q». 
'"~ See id., 91 Stat. 1601-03 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(h)(I». The transfer 
of Section 404 responsibility to a state is subject to the approval of EPA and is expressly 
conditioned upon the state's adoption of a program that assures that discharges will comply 
with the 404(b) guidelines of EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1977). Approval of a state program 
may be revoked if EPA determines that it is not being conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 404. See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1603 (1977) (to be codified 
in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(i). EPA must be furnished with a copy of each application rpceived by 
a state under its 404 program, in order to insure that the views of other federal agencies will 
be part of the administrative review. See id. (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(j». See also 
id., 91 Stat. 1604 (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(m) (Fish and Wildlife Service Review). 
Finally, no state may issue a permit over the objection of the EPA Administrator. See id., 91 
Stat. 1603 (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(j». See also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1976) (allowing 
EPA administrator to veto permit issuance on the basis of certain criteria). 
zoo See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1601 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(g)(I». Thus, Corps dredging activities will not be subject to state regulation under 
Section 404, but states may regulate Corps dredging projects under other provisions of state 
law. 
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subsection (t) provides that "[n]othing in this section shall pre-
clude or deny the right of any State or interstate agency to control 
the discharge of dredged or fill material ... including any activity 
of any Federal agency ... " by means of state law.291 Therefore, with 
respect to activities in waters reserved within Corps jurisdiction 
under Section 404 and with respect to federal projects specifically 
exempted from permitting under Section 404, states may still enact 
restrictive legislation.292 
C. Substantive Effects of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 
1977 
The Clean Water Act of 1977 continues the trend of withdrawing 
certain activities from Section 404 permit review first evidenced in 
the 1975 and 1977 regulations. However, considering the alternative 
of no regulation whatsoever outside of waters actually used or of 
potential use in interstate commerce,293 the Act appears to be a 
viable compromise preserving administrative review of projects in-
volving major hydrologic modification. Inasmuch as Congress may 
have never intended any form of wetlands protection in enacting the 
1972 FWPCA,294 the Clean Water Act's preservation of Section 404 
was a significant political accomplishment. As President Carter 
commented upon signing the Act into law, "the Nation's wetlands 
will continue to be protected under a framework which is workable 
and which shares responsibility with the States. "295 
Nevertheless, problems remain. States are not encouraged to take 
over the regulation of dredge and fill activities by assuming the 
Section 404 program because of the complexity and resulting ex-
,,, Id., 91 Stat. 1606 (1977) (to be codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t)). 
21' The 1977 Clean Water Act was intended to amend FWPCA and resolve several contro-
versies of interpretation that had arisen in the course of implementing and applying the 1972 
Amendments. Complex problems involving issues of federalism, the applicability of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976) and the discretion of agencies 
administering the provisions of FWPCA were reviewed and resolution was attempted through 
amendment of the legislation. Some of these problems are reflected in the amendments to 
Section 404, but analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed 
review of Section 404 of the CWA, see Thompson, Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1977: Hydrologic Modification, Wetlands Protection and the 
Physical Integrity of the Nation's Waters, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 264, 275-87 (1978). 
'0:1 This was the proposal of the Breaux Amendment, H.R. 9650, § 17,"94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(1976). 
"" See text at notes 120-35, supra. 
21. Statement of President Jimmy Carter (Dec. 28, 1977), reprinted in 3 CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER Acr OF 1977, 181 (1978). 
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pense involved in the initial transfer process and subsequent admin-
istration of the program.298 Some states may prefer to continue exist-
ing programs based on state law coincidentally with the Corps' pro-
gram; the existence of a federal program may dissuade other states 
from assuming responsibility for "subjects in their traditional area 
of concern;"297 states considering wetlands protection legislation 
more stringent than Section 404 may simply adopt the federal pro-
gram with its broad exemptions. The legal process that has attended 
the evolution of a national wetlands protection program is therefore 
not complete, but awaits a determination as to the success or failure 
of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977.2U8 The nation's valu-
able wetlands, still subject to the pressures of development, hang 
in the balance. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The profound change in attitude toward the vital natural re-
sources called wetlands has fostered an unusual legal process which 
has culminated in a comprehensive federal program regulating the 
discharge of dredged and fill material in "waters of the United 
States" - broadly defined to include vast acres of wetlands. De-
spite the increasing awareness of the value of wetlands, initial state 
regulatory efforts proved insufficient to cope with wetlands destruc-
... In proposed rules published August 21, 1978 EPA summarized the principal require-
ments of state take-over of Section 404 responsibility which are in addition to the policies 
and requirements under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). Included are the following: 
1. Assurances that the state will pursue a coordinated strategy with EPA and the Corps; 
2. Development of a memorandum of agreement as to which waters the state will regu-
late, and those which the Corps will regulate; 
3. Procedures for joint processing of Section 404 and Section 10 permits where applica-
ble; 
4. General coordination of the state program with Corps programs; 
5. Assurances that the state's law of taking will not adversely affect implementation of 
the state program; 
6. Authority to prohibit, deny, or restrict the issuance of State 404 permits on the basis 
of 404(b) and 404(c) guidelines. 
See 43 Fed. Reg. 37,084-85 (1978). 
207 This is the language used by supporters of the Breaux and Wright Amendments. See, 
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1107, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). Ironically, the genesis of and 
motivating force behind federal involvement in the area of water pollution control had been 
the failure of the states to regulate effectively . 
... In its summary of proposed rules regarding § 404, EPA stated: "in view of the number 
of unresolved issues concerning the requirements for approvable 404 programs, states are 
encouraged not to seek federal approval of their programs until these regulations become final 
.... " 43 Fed. Reg. 37,085 (1978). 
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tion and water quality diminution, while on the federal level the 
expanded application of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 could 
not overcome the constraints of that Act's traditional jurisdictional 
framework of navigable waters. The ensuing enactment of FWPCA 
in 1972 and the confusing language of Section 404 laid a precarious 
foundation upon which a federal permit program protecting wet-
lands could oe established. Administrative development of the Sec-
tion 404 program pursuant to court order exerted federal jurisdiction 
over wetland areas while attempting to accommodate competing 
political interests and reckon with practical problems by experi-
menting with definitional exemptions and novel permit procedures. 
Finally, the United States Congress reviewed the program and 
amended Section 404. The Clean Water Act of 1977 revamped Sec-
tion 404 and revised the dredge and fill permit program by incorpo-
rating the exemptions and procedures administratively developed. 
It also provided for increased state involvement in the program 
while maintaining the broad territorial scope of the interpretation 
of the term "navigable waters" as used in the original 1972 Act. 
Although the substantive provisions developed by the administra-
tive and legislative revision of Section 404 indicate a retreat from 
widescale regulation of all activities involving the discharge of 
dredged and fill material into waters ofthe United States, at present 
Section 404 protects many wetland areas from the destructive im-
pacts of large scale, ill-conceived hydrologic modification. The pe-
culiar development of Section 404 is at least partly responsible for 
the problems that remain with the program. Assumption of the 
program by states will be a costly and cumbersome procedure, and 
the willingness and ability of individual state governments to ad-
minister the expensive program is unknown. Moreover, inasmuch as 
the original Section 404 never mentioned wetlands, and since the 
1977 amendments only continue the statutory reference to navigable 
waters, the entire Section 404 program continues to suffer from the 
absence of an explicit legislative statement of intent to protect wet-
lands. 
Nevertheless, the defeat of the Breaux and Wright Amendments 
and the continuation of a broad interpretation of "waters of the 
United States" indicate congressional recognition of the important 
relationship between wetlands and water quality.299 The growing 
,,. As a part of the Clean Water Act of 1977, the United States Congress authorized six 
million dollars to complete the National Wetlands Inventory of the United States. The inven-
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national awareness of the value of wetlands - expressed through 
the continued lobbying efforts of environmental organizations -
combined with effective implementation and enforcement of Sec-
tion 404 can provide a valuable contribution toward the achieve-
ment of the goals of FWPCA and to the restoration and mainte-
nance of an ecologically balanced environment. 
tory is under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and is expected to be completed 
by December 31, 1981. See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 34(b)(i)(2), 91 Stat. 1578 (1977). 
